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Understanding Financial Instability: Minsky 
versus the Austrians  
 
By Ludwig van den Hauwe, Ph.D. 
 
1. Financial Crisis, Great Recession and Heterodox Macroeconomics   
                                      
There is a widespread perception that the fact that mainstream economics 
proved useless in predicting, tackling or even imagining the biggest financial 
debacle in the world’s most advanced economies for eighty years constitutes 
clear evidence of its intellectual failure. (Kates 2010, 2011; Wolf  2014)  
One heterodox approach that has gained enormous influence and prestige among 
interpreters of the financial and economic crisis that began in 2007-8 is that of 
the late Hyman Minsky. Minsky’s view was that economics should include the 
possibility of severe crises, not as the result of external shocks, but as events that 
emerge from within the system. Crises, according to Minsky, have proved a 
persistent feature of capitalist economies. Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis is a model of a capitalist economy which does not rely upon 
exogenous shocks to generate business cycles of varying severity: the hypothesis 
contends that historical business cycles are compounded out of the internal 
dynamics of capitalist economies as well as out of the system of interventions 
and regulations designed to keep the economy operating within reasonable 
bounds. 
As the author of one such influential narrative conceded recently:   
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“My personal perspective on economics has failed the test set by the late and 
almost universally ignored Hyman Minsky. (…) This book aims to learn from 
that mistake. One of its goals is to ask whether Minsky’s demand for a theory 
that generates the possibility of great depressions is reasonable and, if so, how 
economists should respond. I believe it is quite reasonable.” (Wolf 2014, xvi) 
Wolf also raises the following question:  
“Were the Austrian economists or the post-Keynesians closer to the truth than 
orthodox economists who ran central banks and advised treasuries? The answer 
will be that the heterodox economists were indeed more right than the 
orthodox.” (ibid. 5)  
This observation still leaves open the answer to the question of whether the 
Austrian or the post-Keynesian economists were actually right. It would be 
highly misleading to suggest that both heterodox approaches, the Austrian and 
the Minskyan, offer somehow similar analyses of what went wrong, or that they 
offer similar advice as to the appropriate remedies. Somewhat less influential 
but no less relevant and pertinent has indeed been the approach of economists of 
the Austrian School in explaining and understanding the events leading up to the 
financial crises and the following economic recession. It has not always been 
clearly perceived, however, whether the post-Keynesian and Austrian accounts 
are complementary, partly complementary and partly incompatible, or entirely 
incompatible. Roughly speaking, and as Wolf himself points out, the issue can 
be summarized as follows: Despite their differences, the post-Keynesian school, 
with its suspicion of free markets, and the Austrian school, with its fervent belief 
in them, both agree that crises are inevitable in our present economic system, 
though they disagree on what causes crisis and what to do about them when they 
happen. (Wolf 2014, xvii)  
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Leijonhufvud (2009, 742) , however, suggests complementarity rather than 
incompatibility between the two approaches. Writing about the financial crisis, 
he writes: 
“Operating an interest targeting regime keying on the consumer price index 
(CPI), the Fed was lured into keeping interest rates far too low for far too long. 
The result was inflation of asset prices combined with a general deterioration of 
credit quality (….). This, of course, does not make a Keynesian story. Rather, it 
is a variation on the Austrian overinvestment (or malinvestment) theme. But 
Mises and Hayek had very little to say about the financial side of an 
overinvestment boom that is of interest to us 80 years later. For a thorough 
analysis of that subject one has to turn to Human Minsky.” 
Resolving this issue in greater detail, however, requires taking a closer look at 
the specifics of the respective theories. This is the purpose of this paper. 
I will first summarize Minsky’s FIH as well as the Austrian theory of the 
business cycle. Subsequently I will proceed to a discussion comparing both 
approaches along several dimensions. I will also mention some contributions 
within both schools offering analyses of the historical experience of the 
Financial Crisis and Great Recession. Finally, I will discuss the policy 
implications according to both theories.  
This investigation will allow us to conclude that whatever similarities or even 
analogies may exist between both approaches these are in fact highly superficial 
while at a fundamental conceptual level the divergences between the two 
approaches remain profound and fundamental. 
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2. The Austrian theory of the business cycle in a nutshell 
 
As explained by Garrison (2001, 2005) the Austrian theory of the business cycle 
emerges from a straightforward comparison of savings-induced growth which is 
sustainable, with a credit-induced boom, which is not sustainable. 
An increase in saving by individuals and a credit expansion orchestrated by the 
central bank set into motion market processes whose initial allocational effects 
on the economy´s capital structure are similar. The ultimate consequences of the 
two processes stand in stark contrast, however. Whereas saving entails genuine 
growth, credit expansion leads to boom and bust. If market participants´ time 
preferences, i.e. their degree of preference for present over future goods, falls, 
then they will tend to consume less now and save and invest more; at the same 
time, and for the same reason, the rate of interest will fall. A decrease in the 
interest rate causes resources to be transferred from the late and final stages to 
the early stages. The structure of production is thus modified. It will now be 
depicted by a Hayekian triangle with a longer time-dimension leg and an 
(initially) shorter consumable-output leg. The time profile of consumption thus 
becomes skewed toward the future. In a genuine savings-induced boom 
increased investment in longer-term projects is thus consistent with the 
underlying economic realities. This is not true in the case of a policy-induced 
artificial boom. In the hypothesis of an artificial boom, the change in the 
interest-rate signal and the change in resource availabilities are at odds with one 
another. If the central bank pads the supply of loanable funds with newly created 
money, the interest rate is lowered and long-term investment projects are being 
initiated, just as in the case of an increase in saving. However, in the absence of 
an actual change in time preferences, no additional resources for sustaining the 
policy-induced boom are freed up. In fact, facing a lower interest rate, people 
will save less and spend more on current consumables. In other words, the 
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central bank´s credit expansion drives a wedge between saving and investment; 
it results in an incompatible mix of market forces. Malinvestment and 
overconsumption will be observed. Of course, as the market guides these new 
long-term investment projects into their intermediate and later stages, the 
underlying economic realities become increasingly clear and ultimately re-
affirm themselves. Entrepreneurs will encounter resource scarcities that are 
more constraining than was implied by the pattern of wages, prices, and interest 
rates that characterized the early phase of the boom. The bidding for 
increasingly scarce resources and the accompanying increased demands for 
credit put upward pressure on the interest rate. On the eve of the bust, “distress 
borrowing” allows some producers to finish their projects and minimize their 
losses. At the same time, the high interest rates cause people to curtail their 
consumption and to save instead. Where “overconsumption” had first been 
observed, “forced saving” now takes place. The change in saving is far short of 
sufficient, however, in comparison to the saving actually needed to see the 
policy-induced investments through to completion. The ensuing period of 
liquidation involves higher-than-normal levels of unemployment. 
Clearly the consumption and investment magnitudes will not simply return to 
their previous pre-boom sustainable levels. Given the intertemporal 
disequilibrium created during the boom, needed liquidation may well take the 
economy inside its production possibilities frontier (PPF). Under favourable 
conditions, market forces may bring business decisions back into conformity 
with actual consumer preferences. 
There is clearly also a danger, however, especially in the face of ill-conceived 
policy actions by the monetary and fiscal authorities, that the recovery phase 
will be preempted by spiraling downward into deep depression, that is, self-
reversing changes in the capital structure may give way to a self-aggravating 
downward spiral in both income and spending. 
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The market is capable of allocating resources in conformity with intertemporal 
preferences on the basis of a market-determined (natural) rate of interest. It 
follows, then, almost as a corollary that an interest rate substantially influenced 
by extra-market forces will lead to an intertemporal misallocation of resources. 
The role of the central bank and the consequences of its liquidity-providing 
interventions are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1                                                          C 
                                               C       
 
 
 
 
   Stages of Production                                                                                     I                                                                       
                                                                          i 
                                                                                 D                                      S 
                                                                         i1,2                                                                                               
                                                                                 S+∆M 
 
                                                                                                 S2    S1=I1   I2       S/I 
 
A lowering of the interest rate from i1 to i2 drives a wedge between saving and 
investment. The supply and demand of loanable funds are in equilibrium,                 
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I2=S2 + ∆M, but there is no equilibrium between saving and investment (S2<I2). 
The wedge between saving and investment shown in the loanable funds market 
translates to the production possibilities frontier (PPF) as a tug-of-war between 
consumers and investors. The conflicting market forces that are trying to pull the 
economy in opposite directions are manifested in the economy’s capital 
structure as clashing triangles. (also Gloria-Palermo 2013, 86-87; Van den 
Hauwe 2009, 13-14) 
The Austrian theory of the business cycle is thus a theory of boom and bust with 
special attention to the extra-market forces that initiate the boom and the 
market’s own self-correcting forces that turn boom into bust. Whereas increased 
saving lowers the rate of interest and gives rise to a genuine boom—one in 
which no self-correction is called for; the economy now simply grows at a more 
rapid rate—by contrast, a falsified interest rate that mimics the loan market 
conditions of a genuine boom but is not accompanied by the requisite savings 
gives rise to an artificial boom, one whose artificiality is eventually revealed by 
the market’s reaction to excessively future-oriented production activities in 
conditions of insufficient saving. Misallocations are followed by reallocations. 
The Austrian theory is not a theory of depression per se but rather a theory of 
the unsustainable boom. The focus of the theory is the intertemporal 
discoordination—a general mismatch between intertemporal consumption and 
saving preferences and intertemporal production plans—and hence the 
inevitable crisis and downturn. (Garrison ibid. 240)  As pointed out already, 
Austrians recognize that self-reversing changes in the capital structure may give 
way to a self-aggravating downward spiral in both income and spending. The 
spiraling downward, which was the primary focus of conventionally interpreted 
Keynesianism, was described by Hayek as the “secondary deflation”—in 
recognition of the fact that the primary problem was something else: the 
intertemporal misallocation of resources, or, to use Mises’s term, 
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malinvestment. (ibid. 75) Austrians thus acknowledge the fact that a bad 
situation can get worse but would generally argue that the self-aggravating 
downward spiral leading into deep depression is to be explained by significant 
government intervention on several levels thwarting market adjustment by 
constraining exchange opportunities. 
 
3. Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis in a nutshell 
 
In this section I will provide a summary statement of Minsky’s analysis of 
financial instability. The post-Keynesian literature contains several excellent 
summaries which I will use freely, besides Minsky’s three books. (Bellofiore 
and Ferri  2001a  and 2001b; Fazzari and Papadimitriou 1992; Papadimitriou 
and Wray 2010; De Antoni 2010)  
The two cornerstones of Minsky’s analysis are his “financial theory of 
investment” which considers the ways in which investment is financed, and the 
cumulative processes. (De Antoni ibid. 462) 
The core of Minsky’s analysis is a financial theory of investment according to 
which investment is essentially driven by: (i) the difference between the market 
price of capital goods in place and the current price of investments goods; (ii) 
the volume of internal finance. 
As to the first factor, Minsky writes: “Prices of capital assets depend upon 
current views of future profit (quasi-rent) flows and the current subjective value 
placed upon the insurance against uncertainty embodied in money or quick cash: 
these current views depend upon expectations that are held about the longer run 
development of the economy. The prices of current output are based upon 
current views of near term demand conditions and current knowledge of money 
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wage rates. Thus the prices of current output (…) depend upon shorter run 
expectations. Capital-asset and current output prices are based upon expectations 
over quite different time horizons: capital output prices reflect long run 
expectations and current output prices reflect short term expectations.” (Minsky 
1982, 94-5) 
As to the second factor, Minsky notes that the investment which can be debt 
financed today depends on the cash flows expected by both borrowers (firms) 
and lenders (banks) tomorrow. The higher the realized cash flow relative to debt 
commitments, the higher the rate of fulfillment of contracts, which positively 
affects the state of confidence of both bankers and business people and leads to a 
higher volume of investment being financed and carried out. 
 
Minsky’s theory of investment determination can be illustrated with the help of 
Figure 2. 
              Figure 2  
 
                                                                                      P schedule   V schedule 
             V 
            V* 
             P  
 
                                      A0      A1            K*                               K 
 
10 
 
The quantity of capital is measured on the x-axis and the “prices” of capital on 
the y-axis. Minsky draws a distinction between the supply price of investment 
goods—which we assume for simplicity to be equal to the average price level 
(P)—and the market price of capital assets (V), which can be thought of as the 
present value of the stream of expected quasi rent per unit of capital. By 
assumption the latter coincides with the stock price. 
Investment can be financed in part by means of internally generated funds, 
which coincide with net worth (A) and in part by external finance. For a given 
price of newly produced capital goods (say P0) and a given level of internal 
finance (say A0) we can determine the maximum volume of investment which 
can be financed by means of internal funds K0=A0. 
By assumption, the quasi rent is increasing with the volume of net worth. Hence 
we can compute the market price V0 as an increasing function of A0. (Assenza et 
al. 2010, 185) 
If the firm chooses a level of investment greater than K0, it has to raise funds on 
the credit market. In this case banks have to be remunerated for the risk they 
assume (lender’s risk), so that the actual supply price of investment goods for 
the borrowing firm is higher than the price of newly produced capital goods P0. 
The schedule of the actual price of investment goods (P schedule), therefore, is 
flat at P0 until the maximum volume of internally financed investment K0 is 
reached and is increasing thereafter. 
Symmetrically, if the firm chooses a level of investment greater than K0, the risk 
of bankruptcy for the firm (borrower’s risk) increases and the expected quasi 
rent decreases so that the actual stock price is lower than the original oneV0. The 
schedule of the actual market price of investment goods (V schedule), therefore, 
is flat at V0 until the maximum volume of internally financed investment K0 is 
reached and is decreasing thereafter. 
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The equilibrium volume of investment (K*) and the equilibrium price of 
investment goods (V*) are determined at the intersection of the upward sloping 
schedule representing the supply price of investment augmented by lender’s risk 
and the downward sloping schedule which describes the market price of capital 
goods augmented by borrower’s risk. Equilibrium investment depends upon the 
volume of internal finance and on the degree of borrower’s and lender’s risk 
which affect the slopes of the V and P schedules: K*=K(A0). An increase in the 
availability of internal funds from A0 to A1 brings about an outward shift of both 
the V and P schedules and an increase of investment as shown in the figure. 
The FIH is based on the distinction between hedge, speculative and Ponzi units: 
“For hedge financing units, the cash flows from participation in income 
production are expected to exceed the contractual payments on outstanding 
debts in every period. For speculative financing units, the total expected cash 
flows from participation in income production when totaled over the foreseeable 
future exceed the total cash payments on outstanding debt, but the near term 
payment commitments exceed the near term cash flows from participation in 
income production, even though the net income portion of the near term cash 
flows (…) exceeds the near term interest payments on debt. A Ponzi finance unit 
is a speculative financing unit for which the income component of the near term 
cash flows falls short of the near term interest payments on debt so that for some 
time in the future the outstanding debt will grow due to interest on existing debt. 
Both speculative and Ponzi units can fulfill their payment commitments on debts 
only by borrowing (or disposing of assets).” (Minsky 1982, 22-3) 
In a ‘tranquil era’ both borrowers and lenders expect future cash flows to be 
more than enough to validate debt. Asset prices, which incorporate these 
expectations, increase relative to the price of current output, stimulating 
investments which in turn drive up output, profits and employment.   
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Minsky’s cumulative processes, based on the interdependence between 
investment and profits come into play. The interdependence between investment 
and profits becomes the basis of an upward spiral involving all the variables, 
with the exception of borrower and lender risks, which fall with expansionary 
effects on investment. The increasing debt is thus associated with decreasing 
safety margins. As the real sector grows, the financial system becomes more and 
more fragile. 
Banks are less cautious in extending credit and firms are less cautious in 
borrowing. As a consequence hedge units, that is, borrowers who are able to 
service debt in each and every period of the time horizon of their financial 
contracts, become speculative units. Borrowers who were speculative units, in 
turn, become Ponzi units, that is, they have to borrow in order to service 
outstanding debt. As the proportion of hedge units in the population of 
borrowers decreases, financial fragility increases. 
In this heterogeneous agents’ setting, the increase of aggregate financial fragility 
during the expansion is due to the change of the structure of the economy, the 
weight of hedge units shrinking over time. When the perception spreads that in 
the aggregate cash flows do not validate debt any more, the network of financial 
relations collapses and a financial crisis sets in. (Assenza et al. ibid. 189) 
Minsky thus points to two drawbacks to the investment boom. First is its 
increasingly speculative nature. In the general euphoria, firms’ debt 
commitments increase faster than profits and eventually exceed them. Expecting 
a future bonanza, firms start financing their principal by resort to debt 
(speculative financing) and then even interest payments (ultra-speculative or 
Ponzi financing). Thus an initially robust financial system becomes fragile. 
Second is that the persistence of the boom inevitably creates either bottlenecks 
in the financial system or inflationary pressures in the goods market that end up 
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requiring a monetary restriction. In either case, the result is a rise in the rate of 
interest. (De Antoni ibid. 468-9) 
The higher interest rate ends the boom, and the investment-profit-investment 
chain reverts to a downward spiral. 
Several critical observations are already in place: 
(1) Significantly Minsky’s theory is a theory of the upper turning point. This 
aspect of his analysis provides an important element of analogy with the 
Austrian theory of the business cycle which is equally a theory of the upper 
turning point. In this respect Minsky’s analysis is actually closer to the Austrian 
approach to the analysis of business cycles than to Keynesian insights and his 
status as a Keynesian along this dimension seems somewhat questionable.  
(2) Minsky implicitly assumes that the actual investment gearing ratio between 
external and internal financing aligns itself with the desired, thus rising pro-
cyclically in the upswing and falling in the downswing. As investment increases, 
external financing grows faster than internal. As a consequence, the incidence of 
debt commitments on profits rises: finance becomes less hedge and more 
speculative. Minsky’s line of reasoning here is questionable, however. The good 
performance of the real sector (profits included) might strengthen rather than 
weaken the financial sector. (De Antoni ibid. 465)  
It is less clear, however, whether the Austrian theory relies on an assumption of 
this sort. 
(3) Minsky’s description of cumulative processes seems to fit the world in which 
we now live but a crucial question remains to be answered. What causes the 
initial increase in investment? The answer lies in Minsky’s ‘upward instability 
proposition’ that ‘stability—or tranquility—is destabilizing’ and ‘the 
fundamental instability is upward’. A period of tranquility (in which profits are 
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systematically greater than inherited debt commitments) fosters greater 
confidence in the future, giving rise to a wealth reallocation from money to non-
monetary assets, which in turn drives up asset prices. The result is the initial 
externally financed increase in investment that triggers cumulative processes. 
Still one might consider that the explanatory power or strength of the upward 
instability proposition is weak. (See further.) 
At this point some additional insights can be provided by the alternative 
paradigm that is sometimes designated as “the Wicksell Connection” or “the 
Austro-Wicksellian Connection”. Leijonhufvud had taught us that “the theory of 
the interest rate mechanism is the center of the confusion in modern 
macroeconomics.” (1981, 131)  
According to Leijonhufvud: 
“In Wicksell’s theory of the cumulative process, the maladjustment of the 
interest rate—the discrepancy between the market rate and the natural rate—is 
the central idea. It is also the idea that motivates the analysis of changes in the 
price-level (or in nominal income) in terms of saving and investment. It is a 
simple but fundamental point. Use of the saving-investment approach to income 
fluctuations is predicated on the hypothesis that the interest rate mechanism fails 
to coordinate saving and investment decisions appropriately.” (ibid. 132) 
The Austrians clearly descend from the Wicksell Connection. The Austrian 
theory of the business cycle, which has been explained, clearly shows how a 
lowering of the market rate of interest below the natural rate will set the 
economy on an unsustainable growth path. 
What about Minsky? Can Minsky qualify as belonging to the Wicksell 
Connection?  This question will be further discussed in section 4. (a) hereunder. 
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While one will look in vain for a single reference to Wicksell in Minsky’s three 
books, on a number of occasions Minsky refers to Fisher’s debt-deflation theory 
which clearly influenced his own debt-deflation theory. Minsky’s debt-deflation 
theory emphasizes the role of the asset market. As in Fisher’s explanation, 
distress selling can be self-defeating, and the asset market and distress selling 
feedback on each other. The fall in asset prices reinforces deflation via a 
negative wealth effect. This can result in a recursive debt-deflation process. The 
policy prescription is, clearly, to avoid the collapse of confidence in banks’ 
liabilities by supporting the price of capital assets.  
There are thus both macroeconomic and microeconomic aspects to financial 
fragility. At the microeconomic level, financial fragility means that elements on 
the liability and/or asset side of the balance sheet (plus off balance sheet assets 
and liabilities) are highly sensitive to changes in interest rate, income, 
amortization rate, and other elements that influence the liquidity and solvency of 
a balance sheet. In this case, not-usual fluctuations in these variables create large 
financial difficulties. The flip side of this high cash-flow sensitivity is a high 
reliance on refinancing sources (high refinancing risk) and/or asset liquidation at 
rising prices (high liquidation risk) in order to pay debt commitments. 
(Tymoigne and Wray 2014, 21) 
At the macroeconomic level, financial fragility can be broadly defined as the 
propensity of financial problems to generate financial instability, that is, large 
disruptions in the financial systems that ultimately manifest themselves in the 
form of a debt-deflation. A debt-deflation is an economic situation that is 
characterized by a downward spiral of debts and asset prices in which indebted 
economic units desperately try to pay their debts by selling many assets at once, 
resulting in a massive drop in asset prices and so increasing the difficulty in 
obtaining enough funds to pay debts, leading to further distress sales. The large 
declines in asset prices negatively affect the net worth of otherwise sound 
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economic units and so may propagate to economic sectors that were not 
previously n difficulty. Thus, financial fragility can be defined as the propensity 
of financial problems to generate a debt deflation. (ibid. 22)  
 
4. Discussion: Minsky versus the Austrians 
 
4. (a) Minsky the Keynesian? 
 
Post-Keynesians distinguish themselves by two characteristics: they are the most 
active group emphasizing expectations and uncertainty as the driving force in 
the General Theory, and they combine this emphasis with intense concentration 
on their own choice of a favorite chapter, Chapter 17—“The Essential Properties 
of Interest and Money”—and on the role of money in “finance.” (Meltzer 1988, 
285)  Minsky is no exception.  Minsky believes, however, that Keynes’ 
discussion in Chapter 17, though perceptive, is flawed because he does not 
explicitly introduce liability structures and the payment commitments they entail 
at this point, even though this entered into his definition of the precautionary 
demand for money. (Minsky 1975 [2008]), 77) As Minsky observes:  
“At a crucial juncture in the argument, stagnationist and exhaustion-of-
investment-opportunity ideas take over from a cyclical perspective in which 
investment, asset holdings, and liability structures are guided by speculative 
considerations.” (ibid.) 
Therefore Minsky describes his task as follows:  
“In order to bring out the power of the ideas involved, we will undertake to 
adjust the argument of chapter 17 by explicitly considering liability structures 
and by setting the argument in a cyclical d speculatie framework.  As modified 
17 
 
by these considerations, the argument of chapter 17 gives us the ingredients for 
an explanation of a speculative investment boom and of why such a boom 
contains, in the development of a crisis-prone setup, the seeds of its own 
destruction. ( ibid. 77)  
The idea of a boom containing “the seeds of its own undoing” is also very 
characteristic of typical formulations of the Austrian theory of boom and bust. 
The impression that Minsky’s interpretation of the General Theory thus yields a 
variant of Keynesian business cycle theorizing not unlike and in some respects 
even close to that of the Austrians is not entirely mistaken.  Nevertheless, the 
similarities will appear to be more superficial than real. 
There exist several interpretations of the General Theory and major differences 
between interpreters about the meaning of the book and its central message.   
According to one influential interpretation, “The General Theory is not about 
the business cycle.” (Meltzer 1988, 250)  Or rather, Keynes main difference, or 
one of his main differences with classical theory, is his concern with two issues, 
avoiding fluctuations and maintaining the optimum level of output. In Chapter 
22 Keynes sketches the application of his theory to the business or trade cycle, 
but there is no implication that involuntary employment cannot persist since he 
believed that “we oscillate (…) round an intermediate position appreciably 
below full employment.” (Keynes 1936 [1997], 254)  He believed that the 
average level of output fluctuates around a (stable) level less than the maximum 
attainable.   
Recently one author has reminded that Keynes and Hayek “not only shared far 
more theoretical ground than is typically realized but also held a deeper 
theoretical affinity with one another than with modern macro.” (Goodspeed 
2012, 2)  The source of this affinity, it is argued, is the “Wicksell Connection” 
which is considered to be responsible for a fundamental convergence of their 
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respective theories of money, capital, and the business cycle during the course of 
the 1930s but which effectively ended with Keynes and Hayek. In short, 
according to this view Keynes and Hayek were not quite the theoretical 
antagonists they were, and have since been, made out to be. (ibid. 3) What about 
Minsky in this respect?  
The suggestion here will be on the one hand, that, despite some superficial 
similarities and analogies, especially concerning the role of money and banking 
institutions in the context of the business cycle, and despite other appearances to 
the contrary, Minsky’s work does not fit very well into the Wicksell Connection, 
and on the other hand, that Minsky’s own status as a Keynesian is somewhat 
questionable. 
Keynes’s belonging to the Wicksell Connection can be questioned too.           
Leijonhufvud (1981, 133) had proposed a grouping of macroeconomic theorists 
along two separate traditions labeled “Saving-Investment Theories” and 
“Quantity Theory.”  Keynes is categorized by Leijonhufvud as a Wicksellian 
but, as is also pointed out by Garrison (1992, 144), this is accomplished by 
patching together a new theory with ideas taken selectively from the Treatise 
and The General Theory. This interpolation between Keynes’s two books is 
designated “Z-theory”. 
Garrison has proposed a different categorization of theorists which differs 
importantly from Leijonhufvud’s in that “Keynes is transferred—on the basis of 
what he actually wrote—t o the other side of the Wicksellian watershed.” 
According to Garrison “Keynes’s chosen level of aggregation, together with is 
neglect of Wicksellian capital-market dynamics, establishes an important 
kinship to Fisher, Friedman, and Patinkin.” (Garrison 1992, 145) 
Minsky’s interpretation of Keynes differs markedly from both Leijonhufvud’s 
and Garrison’s. As claimed by Minsky’s himself, his own interpretation is most 
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faithful to the true vision and message of Keynes. He equally argues that a key 
to correctly interpreting Keynes resides in correctly understanding his 
conceptualization of the role of liquidity preference. 
What is the Wicksell Connection? 
Generally, the Wicksellian connection consists of three primary and tightly 
interrelated themes. The first is that money matters.  The core of the Wicksell 
Connection, in contrast to all approaches of Walrasian descent, consists in the 
integration of real with monetary analysis. (ibid. 3 ff.) This ingredient is 
intimately related to the second element of the Wicksell Connection, namely, the 
identification of intertemporal coordination as the central problem in 
macroeconomics. The Wicksellian economy is one that gives full scope to 
potential coordination failures, with the “dark forces of time and ignorance”, 
poised always to disrupt the coincidence of saving and investment. (ibid. 7 )  
The third and final theme constituting the Wicksell Connection: the problem of 
intertemporal coordination of economic activity is inextricably bound up with 
questions concerning the dispersion, acquisition, and distribution of information 
and knowledge. (ibid. 8) Both Keynes and Hayek struggled to escape the 
invisible hand of the Walrasian auctioneer, with Keynes demonstrating how the 
coordination of individual economic activity could break down, while Hayek 
explored the conditions under which the market could ever get it right. Their 
theoretical analyses were thus not so much opposed to one another as they were 
just nonoverlapping in focus. (ibid. 8) As Garrison also clarifies, the point of the 
contrast between the two visions, which can be summarized in terms of their 
judgments about the existence—or non-existence—of the relevant spontaneous 
order, is a limited one. (Garrison 2000, 166) 
A central element of the Wicksell Connection relates to the identification of 
intertemporal coordination and the role of the interest rate mechanism in this 
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respect as the most important problem in macroeconomics. Although Minsky’s 
analysis confirms the standard negative relationship between investment and the 
interest rates, in his scheme interest rates play a secondary role. Dominating the 
scene are the other determinants of investment, i.e. profit expectations and 
confidence. The future being unknown, Minsky assumes that expectations and 
confidence are myopically based on recent experience. (De Antoni ibid. 464) 
Austrians do not reject any theorizing about the role of confidence or “animal 
spirits” per se but suggest that we need to look more carefully at the way in 
which Big Players in the economic system can affect confidence as a result of 
their dominance. They can boost confidence artificially, for example, through 
loose monetary policy and they can affect it adversely by creating policy 
uncertainty. (Koppl  2014, 130-1) 
As De Antoni points out (ibid. 476) Minsky was not the interpreter of Keynes 
that he supposed himself to be. Experiencing the post-war renaissance instead of 
the tragedy of the Great Depression, he unaware applied Keynes’ economics to a 
system whose fundamental instability is upward. In so doing, he discarded some 
important issues in The General Theory, for instance, the endemic nature of 
unemployment, the persistent damage of depression and above all the 
precariousness of recovery. 
Minsky’s cyclical rereading of The General Theory clashes with authoritative 
alternative interpretations, according to which it has an essentially static nature. 
In fact Minsky’s “financial instability hypothesis” must be considered as an 
extension or a reformulation, not an “interpretation”, of Keynes. (De Antoni 
ibid. 470) 
Thus Minsky tried to insert dynamics into Keynes’s monetary economy of 
production. There is no doubt that the ceiling and floor methodology developed 
by Hicks (1950) is at the heart of Minsky’s methodology to deal with dynamic 
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problems. (Ferri 1992)  From an analytical point of view, this methodology 
implies piecewise linear relationships that generate acceleration in the dynamics 
within definite bounds. According to Minsky, this method is a perfect metaphor 
for the interplay between market forces and the role of policy and institutional 
changes. While the former tends to generate an explosive pattern, the latter 
introduces bounds. (Ferri 2010, 208) 
Minsky’s preoccupation with the upswing constitutes an important analogy 
between his theory of the business cycle and the Austrian theory. One could 
even say, without much exaggeration, that in this crucial respect Minsky’s 
theory is conceptually closer to the Austrian theory than to the Keynesian 
approach: much like the Austrian theory, Minsky’s theory is a theory of the 
upper turning point. Keynes’ perplexities instead focus on the lower turning 
point. Minsky “combats” the upswing, Keynes the downswing. (De Antoni ibid. 
473)   
This circumstance perhaps suggests certain other similarities or even a certain 
affinity between the Austrian theory of the business cycle and Minsky´s 
approach to the understanding of financial instability.  This matter will be 
examined in more detail in further sections. It will appear that the analogies and 
similarities between the two approaches are rather superficial and that 
fundamental conceptual divergences between the two approaches subsist. 
 
4. (b) Providing macroeconomics with micro-foundations 
 
Both Minsky and the Austrians are sensitive to the requirement that 
macroeconomic theories should be provided with adequate micro-foundations.  
In his doctoral dissertation Minsky had already emphasized “the need to relate 
aggregate analysis to the behavior of economic units. In particular, the relation 
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between investment and the behavior of individual firms is investigated.” 
(Minsky 2004, 17) Without any doubt he thus intended to embrace a 
disaggregated approach to business cycle phenomena. Minsky considered his 
approach in the dissertation to lay the micro-foundation for determining macro 
performance. The dissertation is a microeconomic analysis of firm behavior 
encompassing the various decision-making processes regarding entry, market 
structure, expansion, vulnerability and survival.  A firm’s financing relations 
affecting each and every stage of the firm’s development are dependent on its 
capacity to honor obligations in meeting commitments made today with cash 
flows received in the future which in their turn are dependent on the impact the 
business cycle has on the firm. (Papadimitriou 2004, x)  
Austrian theorizing has also been very sensitive to issues of excessive 
aggregation and Austrian economists have generally been critical of 
conventional macroeconomists’ primary focus on aggregate magnitudes and 
their abstracting from individual market participants and their interactions. 
But whereas Minsky develops the linkage of business investment with finance in 
the microeconomic sphere by extending the conventional neoclassical theory of 
the firm, Austrians base their unique macroeconomics on the concept of an 
inter-temporal structure of production. 
In the Austrian approach the attempt to disaggregate the macro-economy and 
macroeconomic theorizing manifests itself most clearly in the central role 
accorded to the capital structure of the economy and to capital theory. (See 
further under f.) 
In Minsky’s theory of investment determination, all the determinants of 
investment can be firm-specific. Moreover, although Minsky’s theory of 
investment determination can be formulated without explicit reference to 
heterogeneity, at a deeper and more significant level Minsky’s ideas can be 
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properly expressed only in an heterogeneous agents’ setting. The FIH is based 
on the distinction among hedge, speculative and Ponzi units. 
Some researchers consider that the role of heterogeneous financial conditions is 
the part of Minsky’s legacy that may be the cornerstone of a new research 
agenda. (Assenza et al. 2010) Assenza et al. (2010) also provide an example of a 
macroeconomic model in which firms are characterized by heterogeneous 
financial conditions at the firm level. 
No doubt contributions like these embody an attempt to disaggregate the 
business cycle, that is, to implement a disaggregated approach to the study of 
business cycles by looking at how the structure of the economy evolves over the 
course of the cycle. 
Austrians’ main objection to Keynesian macroeconomics has often related to the 
excessive level of aggregation exemplified in Keynesian macroeconomic 
models, but clearly Keynesianism—at least post-Keynesianism—is evolving…   
Such attempts to disaggregate the business cycle undeniably constitute an 
element of similarity with the Austrian approach but again this similarity is 
superficial to the extent that the ways in which the business cycle is 
disaggregated in Austrian conceptual models start from quite different 
assumptions. 
In Minsky, the necessity of microfounding the analysis is clear in his study of 
the determinants of investments in a monetary economy and in an uncertain 
environment, as well as in the inquiry about the interaction between cash flows 
and financial commitments. What really matters in Minsky’s framework is more 
the presence of monetary and financial links with the real economy, and the fact 
that the reliance of firms on debt finance makes capitalism intrinsically unstable, 
than the presence of a precise investment function. (Bellofiore and Ferri ibid. 
23-4) 
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The fundamental method in the Austrian economic theory is what has come to 
be called “methodological individualism”. Economic events can only be 
explainable in terms of individual human actions.  This means that the trade 
cycle theory should in essence be a microeconomic explanation of macro events. 
The phenomena of the trade cycle should be explainable in terms of the 
responses of individuals in the system to price signals. (Cochran and Glahe 
1999, 73-4) 
Again the similarity is rather superficial, however. As Bellofiore and Ferri 
explain: 
“Although microfounded, Minsky’s analysis must be interpreted more as a 
macrofoundations of microeconomics than vice versa. This means that his route 
has been macro-micro-macro: he starts from the determination of aggregate 
demand and total gross profits in the period, together with the liability structure 
inherited from the past; then he looks at the micro consequences of the current 
ratio of gross capital income and cash-payment commitments on individual 
choices about financing and investment; and finally he reconstructs the macro 
effects on the system’s evolutionary dynamics. In this perspective, his utilization 
of the Kaleckian profit equation represents both a confirmation of this thesis and 
a deepening of previous writings, (…).” (Bellofiore and Ferri 2001a,  24) 
 
4. (c) Critique of mainstream equilibrium theorizing and use of equilibrium 
concepts 
 
Both Minsky and the Austrians have criticized variants of mainstream 
equilibrium theorizing but while Minsky’s rejection of the “crutch” of 
equilibrium is total and uncompromising, the Austrian theory retains an 
equilibrium concept in an essential way. (Cochran and Glahe 1992) From the 
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Austrian viewpoint, a proper but limited use of an equilibrium concept as a 
benchmark leads to a dynamic disequilibrium theory of a cycle. (Cochran and 
Glahe 1999, 152)  
On the other hand, Austrians are methodologically at odds with neoclassical 
equilibrium theory. They eschew mathematical formalism, especially of the 
mechanistic type, preferring a historical narrative of events, reflecting their 
perception that events form part of dynamic processes that more often than not 
are out of equilibrium. (Simpson 2013, 135) 
The traditional Austrian theory of the cycle has also been characterized as 
profoundly deterministic: the arrival situation is a stationary equilibrium 
determined in a univocal manner on the basis of real variables (preferences, 
techniques and initial endowments of agents) and the ultimate cause of the cycle 
is purely monetary (bank policy). (Gloria-Palermo 1999, 74) 
In Minsky’s view, the traditional re-equilibrating price mechanism has to be 
replaced by quantity mechanisms that exert cumulative effects on one another. 
After reaching their maximum development, the resulting tendencies wane and 
reverse. Advanced capitalist economies thus cyclically fluctuate in a permanent 
disequilibrium. (De Antoni ibid.466) 
On this issue again the approaches of Minsky and the Austrian School may seem 
superficially similar but in fact they differ substantially. As pointed out, the 
Misesian cycle theory was a disequilibrium theory which nevertheless made a 
limited but essential use of an equilibrium concept. A tendency towards 
equilibrium is a key feature of the Austrian cycle. (Cochran and Glahe 1992) 
 
4. (d) Price-theoretic Aspects 
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The Austrian theory of the business cycle has a sound basis in price theory. The 
interest rate is a price. It is the price that strikes a balance between people’s 
eagerness to consume now and their willingness to save for the future. The logic 
of the theory is firmly anchored in the notion that the price system is a 
communications network. A miscommunication in the form of an interest rate 
held below its market, or “natural” level by central-bank policy sets the 
economy off on a growth path that is inherently unsustainable. Given actual 
consumer preferences and resource availabilities, such a policy-induced boom 
contains the seeds of its on undoing.  (Van den Hauwe 2009, 165)  
In the capital-based analysis the market process set in motion by credit 
expansion does not depend in any essential way on there being a change in the 
general level of prices. (Garrison ibid. 71) Hayek had already disputed the ideas 
of Fisher and his followers that money acts upon prices and production only if 
the general price level changes.  
A distinguishing characteristic of Minsky’s work is his contribution to the 
elucidation of Keynes’s price theory. Many believe that Keynes’s work was 
devoid of price theory, but Minsky is one of a small group of post-Keynesian 
economists who has insisted on the importance of the price-theoretic aspects of 
Keynes work, and continued to try to develop this aspect of the Keynesian 
system. 
The Austrian theory of the business cycle incorporates the Wicksellian insight 
that the difference between the real (or natural) and nominal (or market) rate of 
interest is the source of a cumulative process initiated when the former remains 
fixed while increases (decreases) in money cause the latter to decrease 
(increase). From this perspective the Austrian theory could be characterized as a 
“two rate” model to explain cyclical fluctuations.  
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Minsky’s theory, however, comprises a “two price” model which is of a very 
different distinctive nature. According to Minsky, there are really two systems 
of prices in a capitalist economy – one for current output and the other for 
capital assets. When the price level of capital assets is high relative to the price 
level of current output, conditions are favorable for investment; when the price 
level of capital assets is low relative to the price level of current output, then 
conditions are not favorable for investment, and a recession—or a depression—
is indicated. Business cycles result from a dance of these two price levels, even 
as the price of a unit of money is fixed at one. (Kregel 1992, 87; Minsky 1986 
[2008], 160) 
The fundamental relative price in a capitalist economy is thus the relation 
between the price of capital assets and the price of current output. This two-price 
model is the analytical tool by which Minsky integrates his theory of money and 
finance into his theory of investment. 
The price of capital assets is intrinsically disconnected from their cost of 
production. The notions of a basic independence and of a greater instability of 
the price of capital assets relative to output prices follow from Minsky’s tracing 
back of the demand price of new capital goods to the market price of stocks. 
The demand price of the flow of new capital goods depends on the market price 
of the stock of capital assets on the stock exchange. Investment will take place if 
the demand price is higher than the supply price. 
The supply price has two main components: purchase price plus financing costs. 
The purchase price comes from the price system for current output, because 
capital assets are part of current output; thus this price is determined as a mark-
up over labour costs.  
Finance costs include explicit costs (interest rate and fees) and implicit costs 
(increased supervision by lenders). These tend to rise with the quantity of 
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investment because lenders perceive greater risk associated with larger loans – 
what Keynes had called lender’s risk. 
The supply price must be weighed against the demand price—which mainly 
comes out of the asset price system. This is the price one is willing to pay for an 
asset, including capital. The main determinant of demand price is expected 
profit. However, expected profits are in the future and are uncertain. They are 
discounted before they can be compared with supply price. If the capital asset 
will have to be at least partially externally financed, the demand price must 
include a margin to compensate for what Keynes called borrower’s risk. The 
greater the quantity of external finance required, the greater the perceived 
borrower’s risk because of higher payment commitments. 
As we have pointed out, taking into account the internal financing constraint, the 
possibility of raising borrowed funds and the conditions shaping external finance 
of positions in capital assets, the intersection of the demand price function with 
the supply price function of new capital goods determines investment demand 
and production. 
Arguably Minsky’s two price systems analysis is a better way to analyze the 
financial capitalist economy than is the consumption/investment approach of the 
orthodox textbooks. 
First, there is the price system for current output, which includes consumption, 
investment, government, and export goods and services. Prices of current output 
are essentially set as a mark-up over labour costs. Of course, market power 
allows the individual firm to set price at a greater mark-up. At the micro level, 
the mark-up distributes profits among firms, with market power leading to a 
greater share of profit flows. 
The price of current output represents the “carrier of profits” and the means for 
validation of debts. Current output prices are determined by investment 
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expenditures and supported by Big Government expenditure flows. Big 
government is, in reality, a support system for private sector current output 
prices and profits. The second system of prices (of capital assets) helps 
determine the first set through its impact on investment.  Since the decision to 
hold capital assets is also a decision concerning their financing, investment 
represents a decision about both asset and liability structures. (also Kregel ibid. 
87) The endogenous generation of instability is built around the linkage between 
current output prices and the demand for investment and capital goods prices. 
Minsky had to go back to the Treatise to find the two-price trail. There are two 
levels to the “two prices” approach. The first level, presented in the Treatise, 
distinguishes between the prices of current output and capital goods output; the 
second level, added in the General  Theory , distinguishes the prices of new and 
existing capital assets from the prices of new and existing financial liabilities. 
The first is sufficient to express the financial instability hypothesis, while the 
second is necessary to analyze fully how a change in asset prices will affect 
confidence in bank liabilities and how it may or may not lead to financial panic. 
(Kregel ibid. 95) 
  
4. (e) Monetary Aspects 
 
4. e.1. Inter-dependence between real and monetary aspects  
 
Economists commonly distinguish between monetary and non-monetary 
theories or explanations of the business cycle. While Keynes’ theory of the cycle 
has been characterized as a real theory (Meltzer 1988, 179),  both Minsky’s 
theory and the Austrian theory of the business cycle can be characterized as 
belonging to the monetary approach to the explanation of business cycles.   
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In contrast money has no role in, e.g., real business cycle theory (RBC). Real 
business cycle theory is thus an example of a non-monetary theory of the 
business cycle. The theory attributes business cycles to real or supply shocks, 
such as changes in technology. (Rabin 2004, 208)  
According to the RBC theory, exogenous fluctuations in the level of total factor 
productivity make steady reallocations of the factors of production necessary in 
order to maintain an efficient economic allocation. Observed business 
fluctuations are explained as the efficient outcome of the interaction between 
agents’ maximizing behavior. (Lutz 2002, Chapter 5)   
According to Minsky business cycles are both monetary and real phenomena. 
The artificial separation between monetary and real phenomena is inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that the analysis of the determinants of investment is 
necessary for business cycle theory. As investment behavior is related to prices 
(the interest rates) which are determined, at least in part, in the financial and 
money markets, no theory of the business cycle which does not consider the 
interrelations between financial and real factors is consistent with the key 
hypothesis as to the significance of investment behavior. (Minsky 2004, 87) 
Minsky concluded that the financing of a firm’s expansion may result in a 
deterioration of its survival conditions. Therefore the liquidity crises of the 
downswing can be imputed to the development of the expansion. (ibid. xiv) 
As we have explained, and as is reminded by Machlup’s well-known statement, 
“(t)he fundamental thesis of Hayek’s theory of the business cycle was that 
monetary factors cause the cycle but real phenomena constitute it.” (Machlup 
1976, 23) 
While Austrians would of course not subscribe to the view that interest rates are 
determined in the money and financial markets, both Minsky and the Austrians 
thus agree that any adequate explanation of the business cycle will highlight 
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both the monetary and the real factors involved.  But, again, the specifics of the 
explanations are quite different. 
 
4. e.2. The non-neutrality of money                                                           
 
Minsky’s work is best understood as a contribution to the general theory of 
money. In particular his work represents the most significant American 
contribution of his generation to the Banking School tradition of monetary 
thought that sees money arising as the natural byproduct of business finance. 
(Mehrling 1999, 150)  
The dominant microeconomic paradigm is an equilibrium construct in which 
initial endowments of agents, preference systems, and production relations, 
along with maximizing behavior, determine relative prices, outputs, and an 
allocation of outputs to agents. Money and financial interrelations are not 
relevant to the determination of these equilibrium variables. An implication of 
these constructs in the dominant microeconomics and the core of the dominant 
macroeconomics is that money and finance are neutral. In these dominant 
models money is a veil. (Minsky 1993, 77)  
As Friedman put it, although money and other institutions complicate the 
analysis, all the important characteristics of a modern capitalist economy are 
supposed to be contained in the simple model of the barter economy. (Minsky 
1986 [2008], 129) 
But in the real world, in the financial capitalist world, money is the key 
institution. It is endogenous, created during normal economic processes. Minsky 
emphasizes that, most importantly, money is created in the process of financing 
positions in assets. Banks increase the money supply whenever they share the 
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belief of the borrower that positions in assets or financed activity will generate 
sufficient cash flows. If the future turns out to be worse than expected, it may be 
impossible to meet commitments. So money and nominal financial 
commitments matter.  
 The conventional economic paradigm is thus not the only way economic 
interrelations can be modeled. Every capitalist economy can be described in 
terms of sets of interrelated balance sheets. At every reading of the balance sheet 
the financial instruments can be interpreted as generating two sets of time series: 
the liabilities generate payment commitments, and the assets generate expected 
cash receipts. Balance sheets relations link yesterdays, todays, and tomorrows: 
payment commitments entered in the past lead to cash payments that need to be 
executed now as well as future cash payments, even as liabilities are taken on 
now that commit future cash flows. In this structure the real and the financial 
dimensions of the economy are not separated: there is no so-called real economy 
whose behavior can be studied by abstracting from financial considerations. 
This system, linking yesterdays, todays, and tomorrows both financially and in 
terms of the demand for and supply of goods and services, is not a well-behaved 
linear system. Furthermore, the presumption that this system has an equilibrium 
cannot be sustained. This modeling of the economy leads to a process in time 
that generates a path that can fly off to deep depressions and open-ended 
inflations, even in the absence of exogenous shocks or strange displacements. In 
this model money is never neutral. (Minsky ibid. 78) 
The non-neutrality of money in this version of Keynesian economics is due to 
the difference in how money enters into the determination of the price level of 
capital assets and of current output, that is, investment goods and consumption 
goods in the simplest case. (ibid. 79)  
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Austrian insights concerning the non-neutrality of money derive from an entirely 
different strand of literature.  Austrians are inclined to emphasize “Cantillon 
effects” of changes in the money supply, so called after Richard Cantillon 
([1755] 2001). When new money enters the economy, perhaps as the result of 
gold discoveries under a gold standard, perhaps as the result of credit expansion 
under a fiduciary system, the new money does not penetrate all sectors of the 
economy at a uniform pace. It enters in particular sectors and in particular ways. 
Some prices and incomes are bid up first. The early recipients of the new money 
tend to enjoy increased buying power. Gradually the new money circulates 
around and penetrates all sectors of the economy, but it reaches some sectors 
quite late. Selling prices and nominal incomes in those sectors do not keep pace 
with the general inflation, and their real incomes and purchasing powers suffer. 
A similar story applies in reverse to withdrawals of money from circulation. The 
process does not work uniformly. Changes in the money supply distort, at least 
transitionally, the pattern of relative prices and incomes and consequently distort 
the patterns of resource allocation and production. Such distortions form one 
reason why Austrians take a micro approach to theory and disdain theorizing in 
terms of aggregates and averages. (also Yeager 1988, 95) 
Monetary economists working in the tradition of Cantillon ([1755] 2001) and 
Wicksell ([1936] 1965) recognize that (1) since the process by which real cash 
balances are adjusted and the process by which relative prices are established are 
not two separate market processes, that is, the demands for real goods and 
services are affected as economic agents seek to adjust their cash balances to 
their optimal level, as monetary changes will cause individual cash balances to 
differ from their optimal level; monetary changes affect the relation between the 
demand for and the supply of goods and thus also their relative prices; and that 
(2) the way money enters the economic system will affect the dynamic 
adjustment process even in a predictable way. As recognized earlier by Cantillon 
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([1755] 2001), the demands of those who are initially affected by the monetary 
disturbance change before the demands of those who receive additional money 
balances only as the effects of the monetary change spread through the 
economy. 
The latter point concerning the significance of the point of impact of monetary 
changes and its predictability relates directly to the basis of the Hayek-von 
Mises theory of the trade cycle: if monetary changes enter the economy as 
changes in the availability of credit, as may be expected to be the case in an 
economy with a fractional-reserve banking system, these changes will alter the 
money rate of interest relative to the equilibrium rate and disrupt the balance 
between the supply of and the demand for capital. 
It is the effect of such monetary changes on the money rate of interest relative to 
the natural rate of interest and the consequent effect on the decision to invest 
relative to the decision to save that constitute the saving-investment problem 
that is at the basis of the Austrian natural rate approach to the monetary-
transmission mechanism.  
Monetarists held, as the classics had done, the view that money is both neutral 
and super-neutral in the long run. Neutral money means that an increase in the 
level of the nominal money supply only causes an increase in the aggregate 
price level and does not affect any real economic variables; the term “super-
natural” is an extension of this, which implies that an increase in the rate of 
growth of the money supply will only affect the rate of inflation, and not any 
real variables. (Smithin 2013, 47) 
Friedman’s strategy with respect to this problem was essentially to concede the 
impact of money on output for the short run, but not for the long run. It was held 
that monetary changes can be non-neutral in the short run, but are always neutral 
(and super-neutral) in the long run. With this argument, monetarism was thereby 
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able to retain the basic proposition about the long-run relationship between 
money and inflation, while at the same time providing a viable explanation for 
business cycle fluctuations. (ibid. 65) The Austrian position in this respect is 
clearly distinct from the monetarist, however. As regards the impact of monetary 
stimulus, money is non-neutral even in the long run. (Ravier 2013) 
 
4. e.3. The endogeneity of money 
 
At the most general level, endogeneity implies that the supply of money is not 
independent of demand. Often, however, the exogeneity-endogeneity distinction 
has referred to the ability of the central bank to control the money supply. (Wray 
ibid. 169) Post-Keynesians do not accept money exogeneity, even in the control 
(or weak exogeneity) sense. 
It is possible to conceive of a continuum of possibilities, with strict exogeneity 
at one extreme and strict endogeneity at the other. In the case of strict 
exogeneity, the money supply curve would be vertical in interest-money 
space—this is the so-called “verticalist” approach. Athough this is the way the 
money supply curve is often drawn in orthodox textbooks, even most orthodox 
economists admit that the central bank accommodates shifts in money demand 
to prevent wide fluctuations of interest rates. 
At the other extreme lies complete endogeneity, where money supply 
completely accommodates money demand as the Fed pegs the interest rate. This 
is the “horizontalist” position which has been adopted by, among others, Kaldor.  
Minsky’s approach to money implies an upward-sloping money supply curve. 
There are thus two main strands of the endogenous money approach: the 
horizontalists and those who accept an upward-sloping money supply curve. The 
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key difference between these two strands is over the determination of interest 
rates: the horizontalists argue that interest rates are exogenously set by the 
central bank, while the other strand accepts an endogenously determined interest 
rate. This second approach emphasizes uncertainty, liquidity preference, profit-
seeking behavior, and innovations in addition to central bank behavior. (Wray 
ibid. 174) 
Post-Keynesians have also emphasized the ability of financial institutions to 
economize on reserves and to innovate to escape attempts by the central bank to 
use quantity controls.  Financial innovation and liability management give banks 
great flexibility in determining the quantity of money. These activities play a 
central role in Minsky’s FIH for they contribute to the transition from a robust 
financial system to a fragile one in which liquidity has become stretched. 
Innovations allow an existing quantity of high-powered money to support 
greater expenditures. This can be linked to an upward-sloping velocity function: 
as interest rates rise, banks will expand credit in response to profit opportunities. 
Thus, any given quantity of money, narrowly defined, could permit more 
spending as credit is created. Furthermore, innovations can shift the velocity-
interest rate function so that velocity might increase even without rising interest 
rates. 
Austrians and Keynesians seem to by and large agree on the endogeneity of 
money issue. Garrison writes that irrespective of the tools used by the Federal 
Reserve to change the money supply, the fact that is of overriding significance 
for the application of capital-based macroeconomics is that these alternative 
policy tools are simply different ways of lending money into existence. (ibid. 
68)  
According to Cochran and Glahe (1999, 75 fn) “Hayek’s view of the money 
supply process expressed in his discussion of endogenous versus exogenous 
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theories is compatible with the Post-Keynesian theory of money.”  Godley and 
Lavoie (2012, 127) write that “(t)here is a school of thought that has long been 
arguing in favour of endogenous money. This line of thought goes back to the 
writings of Thomas Tooke and the Banking School, and has been present in the 
history of economic thought ever since. It can be associated with the Swedish 
economist Knut Wicksell as well as several economists of the Austrian tradition, 
such as von Mises and Friedrich Hayek in the 1920s and 1930s.” 
Hayek had criticized von Mises’s theory, however, as being exogenous. The von 
Mises cycle starts with a monetary injection initiated by the banking system; the 
market rate is decreased below the natural rate as banks extend additional loans. 
The cycle results from an active intervention into the market process. In the 
Hayekian model the cycle may start in this manner, but it may also start if banks 
fail to increase the market rate when the natural rate increases, i.e. if investment 
demand increases and banks are confronted with an increased demand for funds. 
(Hayek           ; Cochran and Glahe ibid. 75) 
In making the endogenous-exogenous distinction, Hayek was arguing that 
cyclical activity will be a standard feature of an economy with an elastic 
currency; an economy where the supply of money either wholly or partially 
responds to changes in the demand for money or the demand for credit. (Hayek      
) 
The Austrian theory of boom and bust, despite its explicit focus on saving, 
investment, consumption, and production time, is equally, root and branch, a 
monetary theory. (Garrison ibid. 52)  
Even if Austrians and Post Keynesians will thus by and large agree with respect 
to the endogenous nature of money, the following distinctive theoretical 
ingredients seem essential to the Austrian position: 
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(a) Consistent with Hayek’s understanding, capital-based macroeconomics treats 
money as a “loose joint” in the economic system. The Austrian theory of boom 
and bust, which presupposes an essential loose-jointedness, identifies a 
systematic misallocation of resources that could not possibly characterize a 
tight-jointed system. Policy-induced inter-temporal disequilibrium is the essence 
of the unsustainable boom. 
(b) The market process set in motion by credit expansion does not depend in any 
essential way on there being a change in the general level prices. (Garrison ibid. 
73) The relative-price changes that initiate the boom are attributable to a 
monetary injection. The focus is on the point of entry of the new money and the 
consequent changes in relative prices that govern the allocation of resources 
over time. (ibid. 67) 
(c) The different aspects of the market process set in motion by a monetary 
injection are not mutually compatible. The conflicting aspects of the market 
process can have their separate real effects before the conflict itself brings the 
process to an end. The very fact that the separate effects are playing themselves 
out in inter-temporal markets means that time is an important dimension in the 
understanding of this process. (ibid. 68)  
(d) The Austrian theory is a malinvestment—rather than an over-investment—
theory of the business cycle. Policy-induced malinvestment is the unique aspect 
of the theory. Malinvestment—the misallocation of resources in the direction of 
stages remote from consumption—has to be taken to be the unique and defining 
aspect of Austrian theory, even if over-investment is a critical enabling aspect of 
the theory. (ibid. 81) 
(e) To the extent that the processes of money injection, credit expansion and the 
resulting malinvestment and misallocations of resources are initiated by a 
“monetary authority”, i.e. essentially an extra-market force, there is not the least 
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implication—not even the mere suggestion—that cyclical instability of a 
monetary origin is necessarily inherent in or “endogenous” to market-based 
forms of capitalism. Historically observed instances of cyclical instability and 
business cycles are phenomena inherent in mixed economies, not in entirely 
market-based economies. (Ikeda 1997, 131-2 and passim)  Moreover, 
hypothetical market-based monetary systems from which the historically 
observed recurrent financial instability would be absent are theoretically 
conceivable and their working characteristics have been described in some 
detail. (Huerta de Soto 2012) The solution to the problems posed by financial 
instability and business cycles are thus not Big Government and a Big Bank 
supposedly acting as stabilizers but monetary decentralization and free banking. 
(f) It follows from the previous observation that business cycles—and in 
particular also their recurrent character—are to be linked not merely to 
monetary policy narrowly conceived, but more broadly and more fundamentally 
to the monetary regime or monetary-institutional framework or context that is in 
place. The Austrian approach thus comprises a significant comparative-
institutional dimension.  
 
4. e.4. The role of credit creation/expansion 
 
The quantity of money can’t be exogenously determined as it is created as a 
result of private profit-seeking behavior. Neither can money be neutral since its 
creation is tied up with the process of creating and controlling capital assets. 
Nominal values (money prices) matter. (Minsky 1986 [2008], 223) 
Money creation is thus intimately tied to the essential feature of capitalism—
capital accumulation. Money is created in the process of financing investment 
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and forces the surplus which is necessary to allow capital formation. More 
fundamentally, credit creation is the means by which society ensures that the 
workers cannot purchase the total product. Credit creation gives purchasing 
power to entrepreneurs so they may finance capital accumulation. As Minsky 
argues, the markup in the consumption goods industry guarantees that workers 
in the investment goods industry can obtain consumption goods, while spending 
on investment goods generates a surplus over labor income. (Minsky 1986, 
Chapter 7) 
The money thus created fulfills two other important functions: it serves as a 
medium of exchange, and it can be held as insurance against an uncertain future. 
Now it is important to note how this analysis importantly differs from the 
Austrian analysis: 
(1) The Austrian analysis also comprises a non-neutrality of money proposition 
but as we have seen the Austrian insights into the non-neutrality of money are 
derived from an entirely different tradition. The Austrian analysis of this issue 
derives from the work of, among others, Cantillon and Wicksell. This author 
hasn’t been able to locate one single reference to the work of either Cantillon or 
Wicksell in Minsky’s three books.   
(2) The Austrian analysis is built around the conceptual and theoretical 
distinction between sustainable growth (or capital accumulation) and 
unsustainable growth (based on credit expansion). Whereas sustainable capital 
accumulation derives from genuine saving, credit expansion leads to 
unsustainable growth, i.e., boom and bust. 
Money and credit created in the process of capital formation is what in the 
Austrian theory is designated as a form of credit expansion. Austrians would 
therefore object to the proposition that capital accumulation as the essential 
feature of capitalist economies is essentially and necessarily tied to credit 
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expansion and money creation as stated by Minsky. Capital formation requires 
genuine saving. In this context Mises made the useful distinction between 
commodity credit and circulation credit. Commodity credit cannot be expanded. 
(Mises (1949 [1966], 433-4) 
Moreover, from the Austrian viewpoint, cyclical and financial instability are not 
inherent in capitalist economies but are essentially phenomena of mixed 
economies.  Austrians can question the adequacy of Minsky’s identification of 
the relevant institutional context. Minsky states or at least strongly suggests that 
the adjective “capitalist” refers to free market economies but all historical 
capitalist economies are actually mixed economies and the instability that is 
observed in history is actually the instability of a mixed system.  At the 
theoretical level this circumstance may still seem to leave open the answer to the 
question whether financial instability is conceivably inherent in free market 
economies or whether it is actually a consequence of government intervention. 
Austrians generally argue that the business cycle is actually generated by public 
authorities’ intervention in market processes.  
The Austrian analysis of the business cycle thus derives from the fusion of 
monetary theory with capital theory, i.e., the introduction of a theory of 
heterogeneous capital into the theoretical analysis of business cycle phenomena. 
This fusion or integration of monetary theory and capital theory is unique to the 
Austrian approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
4. (f) The centrality of capital and capital theory 
 
In Minsky’s theoretical construction too considerations relating to time and 
capital clearly play an important and essential role. He concluded his Stabilizing 
an Unstable Economy (Minsky 1986 [2008], 369) with the consideration that 
“(t)he essential Keynesian result, that capitalism is flawed mainly because it 
handles capital poorly, nowhere enlightens current policy actions (…)” and that 
“Keynes recognized the flaws in capitalism because he, more than his 
predecessors, contemporaries, and successors, understood the financial and 
time-related aspects of a capitalism that uses capital.” 
In the Austrian vision, and as envisioned early on by Menger ([1871] 1994, 80-
87), the economy’s production process is disaggregated into a number of 
temporally sequenced stages of production. Replacing the single investment 
aggregate with temporally sequenced stages that make up the economy’s capital 
structure is what will provide a basis for a substantive distinction between 
sustainable growth and unsustainable boom. 
Austrians thus work at a lower level of aggregation in order to allow for the 
output of the investment-goods sector and of the consumer-goods sector to move 
relative to one another and even to allow for differential movements within the 
investment-goods sector.  
Considerations of capital structure allow the time element to enter the theory in 
a fundamental yet concrete way. (Garrison ibid. 7-8) The macroeconomic 
significance of the fact that production takes time suggests that, for business 
cycle theory, capital and money should get equal billing. (ibid. 8) The critical 
time element manifests itself in the Austrian theory as an intertemporal capital 
structure. (ibid. 8) Attention to the intertemporal structure of production is 
unique to Austrian macroeconomics. The market economy, in the judgment of 
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the Austrians, is capable of tailoring intertemporal production activities to match 
intertemporal consumption preferences. (Garrison 2005, 480-1) 
Hayek felt that the existence of unemployed resources should be explained not 
assumed. The emergence of the crisis and the corresponding idleness of existing 
resources depend, in Hayek’s model, on certain characteristics and aspects of 
capital that are emphasized in “Austrian” capital theory but are ignored in 
typical macroeconomic models. In such models, capital is generally treated as a 
homogeneous mass adaptable to any use; all capital is non-specific. Four main 
characteristics of capital that are ignored in most macroeconomic models but 
appear consistently in Hayek’s writings are: (1) capital goods are non-
homogeneous; (2) capital goods are non-permanent resources; (3) capital goods 
(and other resources) are complementary; and (4) capital goods (as well as 
original factors of production) can be either specific or non-specific. The more 
specific a resource is, the less mobile it is. (See also Cochran and Glahe ibid. 
Chapter 8 and the references there.) 
   
4. (g) The role of uncertainty, institutional context and liquidity preference  
 
4. g.1.Uncertainty 
 
According to Minsky the essential difference between Keynesian and both 
classical and neoclassical economics is the importance attached to uncertainty.  
(Minsky 1982, 128) Minsky believed that the financial strategies followed by 
firms change over time, sometimes as a result of conscious decision making and 
sometimes because of unforeseen changes in circumstances. Like Keynes, 
Minsky believed that the future is essentially unknowable and beliefs regarding 
the future are highly subjective. In fact, Minsky even goes further than Keynes 
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in arguing that individuals often act irrationally, excessively exuberant during 
good times and excessively panicky during bad times.  
Psychology and financial fragility, as measured by the microeconomic financial 
fundamentals of firms play the primary roles in driving business cycles. (Knoop 
2008, 85) 
Svetlova and Fiedler (2011) analyze the views on the meaning of uncertainty 
and probability of Knight, Keynes and Shackle in light of the financial crisis. 
Austrians generally recognize that whereas risk analysis, whether objective or 
subjective, is essentially a weighting of possibilities already known, genuine 
uncertainty allows for the unpredictable growth of these possibilities and thus 
for “gaps” in agents’ probability distributions. Since action takes place in real 
time, any activity designed to deal with uncertainty may merely transform that 
uncertainty. The source of uncertainty is thus endogenous in a world in real 
time. (O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1996, 64 ff. and Ch. 5) At a fundamental theoretical 
level, Ludwig von Mises’s views on probability were closer to the spirit of 
Keynes’s philosophy of probability than to the frequency interpretation of 
Richard von Mises. (Van den Hauwe 2011) The views of post-Keynesians and 
Austrians on the meaning and role of uncertainty thus seem to converge. As we 
will see further, however, they take diametrically opposed positions as regards 
the relationship between real-world uncertainty and the (role of the) institutional 
context.  (See further.) 
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4. g.2. The role of liquidity and liquidity preference  
 
To recognize the endogeneity of money resurrects the Keynesian concept of 
liquidity preference as a central cause of the volatility of macroeconomic 
activity. (Wray 1992) 
In the General Theory, Keynes limits the effects of the needs for liquidity to the 
price of financial liabilities, that is, the interest rate that is charged for the 
creation of bank accommodation. (Kregel 1992, 95) The separation of the 
determinants of the prices of assets and debts – or the distinction between the 
marginal efficiency of capital and liquidity preference – may be called the great 
innovation of the General Theory. (ibid. 94) 
The sharp changes in the money values of assets and liabilities which occur 
independently of any change in their underlying real productive potential can 
now be explained via liquidity preference leading to a fall in liability prices as 
agents shift their holding of financial liabilities to more liquid assets. This, then, 
spills over into firms’ liabilities which are assets for the banks, and leads the 
banks to reduce accommodation in an attempt to restore the liquidity of their 
balance sheets. There is a subsequent rise in the interest rate and a fall in the 
discounted value of anticipated future profits, as well as a downward revision in 
expectations. Both lead to a revision of capital asset prices represented by a 
reduction in the marginal efficiency of capital which reduces investment 
expenditures. (ibid. 94) Keynes himself stated explicitly, however, that 
“Liquidity-preference (…) does not increase until after the collapse in the 
marginal efficiency of capital.” (Keynes 1936[1997], 316)  
According to Minsky, there exists a functional relation between the price of a 
particular or a representative capital or financial asset and the quantity of 
money. Normally the price of a capital asset is a rising function of the quantity 
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of money, for as the quantity increases the value of the insurance in money 
decreases. As the price of money is always one, this implies that the price level 
of income-yielding capital assets increases. The function shifts as experience 
changes expectations of the cash flows that capital and financial assets will yield 
and the worth attached to holding money. (Minsky 1986 [2008$, 203-4) 
The prices of capital assets and debts in different proportions are related to the 
supply of money, which only yields an income in kind l (liquidity premium) and 
which, by definition, has a price of 1. The prices that are generated are the prices 
of the units in the stock of assets, both capital assets and financial assets. 
(Minsky 1975 [2008], 88-9)  
Minsky´s model is a two-price- level model, where, in the short run, current 
output and capital-asset prices depend upon different market processes. Whereas 
wages and the current costs of producing output, and thus the offer prices of 
current output, move sluggishly, the prices of units in the stock of capital assets 
and, more directly, the price of equity shares traded on the exchanges can move 
rapidly. Thus the relation between the two price levels can change quite quickly; 
we have a price level of current output which is in principle sluggish, and a price 
level of capital assets which is in principle volatile.  (ibid. 89) 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Austrians have in general been critical both of liquidity preference theory and of 
the monetary theory of the interest rate. Austrian economists question both the 
central place of liquidity preference in Keynes’s account of the business cycle 
and the legitimacy of the liquidity preference theory itself. According to 
Garrison, “(l)iquidity preference, which is sometimes seen as the sine qua non of 
Keynesianism, plays a secondary role—in terms of both causation and 
chronology—in Keynes’s account of the business cycle.” (ibid. 150) According 
to Rothbard, the Keynesian doctrine of liquidity preference suffers from the 
mathematical-economic sin of “mutual determination.” (Rothbard 2004 785-92) 
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Following Lachmann (1937), Rothbard also points out that in the presence of an 
organized forward or futures market for securities, speculative bearishness 
would indeed cause at least a temporary rise in the rate of interest, but 
accompanied by no increase in the demand for cash. He concludes that “any 
attempted connection between liquidity preference, or demand for cash, and the 
rate of interest, falls to the ground.” (ibid. 792) 
In general Austrians thus reject the Keynesian preoccupation with the relatively 
unimportant problems of the loan market as well as with liquidity preference or 
the demand for money to hold “for speculative purposes”. (Rothbard 
1962[2004], 454-5, 687 ff.) Whereas Keynes criticized Mises´s theory of 
interest because it allegedly “confused” the “marginal efficiency of capital” (the 
net rate of return on an investment) with the rate of interest (Keynes 1936 
[1997], 192-93), Rothbard points out that the “marginal efficiency of capital” is 
indeed the rate of interest. (ibid. 455) It is a price on the time market. The 
equilibrium rate of interest, or the rate of interest as it would tend to be in the 
evenly rotating economy, is determined solely by the time preferences of the 
individuals in society, and by no other factor. (ibid. 331-2)  
 
4. g.3. The important role of institutions 
 
Both post-Keynesians and Austrians tend to stress the role of institutions, in 
particular the role of bank and financial institutions, in economic processes.  
Minsky highlights the significance of banks and financial institutions as profit-
seeking agents which react to perceived profit opportunities with financial 
innovations (and, so, stresses the endogeneity of the “effective” quantity of 
money and of the rate of interest). (Bellofiore and Ferri 2001, 21) 
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From the beginning, Minsky extended profit-seeking behavior from 
entrepreneurs and businessmen to bankers and financiers. Later on, Minsky tried 
to introduce more heterogeneity of behaviour within the same class of agent, 
according to their financial position (hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance). 
(ibid. 23) 
Minsky began his academic life as an analytical institutionalist and this thread 
would run throughout his entire work. (Merhling ibid. 149)   
Part 4 of Minsky’s Stabilizing an Unstable Economy is entitled Institutional 
Dynamics and contains a chapter entitled Banking in a Capitalist Economy. 
According to Minsky, his own view of money, banking, and financial markets 
consistent with the investment-financing perspective he presents, clearly differs 
radically from the standard view, which divorces how money affects the 
economy from any consideration of the specific transactions by which money is 
created. Both the monetarist and standard Keynesian approaches inappropriately 
assume that money can be identified quite independently of institutional usages.   
On the Austrian side, Horwitz contends that “(w)hat the textbook model of the 
Classical economists misses is how money and the banking system work to 
ensure the valid insight behind Say’s Law (…)” (2000, 86) and that “Austrian 
analyses of competition as a discovery process, the Hayekian emphasis on prices  
and knowledge, and the focus on the central role played by institutions, have all 
affected the way economists outside the Austrian tradition are doing their work.” 
(ibid. 237)  
The similarity does not go much further than that, however. First, there is 
complete disagreement as to the type or kind of institutions that would actually 
eliminate or at least mitigate the business cycle and macroeconomic instability. 
Whereas Austrians have made a case in favor of complete freedom of choice in 
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currency and of a system of free banking, and thus the abolition of central banks, 
Minsky has argued in favor of Big Bank and Big Government. 
Moreover post-Keynesians and Austrians conceptualize in entirely different 
ways the relationship between institutions and expectations and also the 
relationship between institutions and “the state of confidence” and fluctuations 
therein. 
As pointed out already, a characteristic feature of Keynes’s analysis is the 
uncertainty of the future. He suggests that in abnormal times in particular the 
economy will be driven up and down by baseless sentiments and waves of 
investor sentiment. Minsky agrees.  
Austrians point out, however, that Keynesian policies, and in particular the 
interventions of Big Players, tend to create and enhance the irregular ups and 
downs that Keynes attributed to modern capitalism as such. In this sense, 
Keynesian policies tend to create a Keynesian economy.  
Roger Koppl thus concludes:  
“Those post-Keynesians who argue for discretionary state intervention as a 
result of certain features of economic behavior argue for policies that will 
increase—rather than reduce—the very behaviours they see as the problem.” 
(ibid. 104) 
This is further explained by the theory of Big Players (Koppl 2002) which is 
akin to the theory of regime uncertainty. (Higgs 1997)   
Big Players and regime uncertainty—or uncertainty about the rules of the 
game—both artificially reduce the state of confidence by corrupting the 
expectations of financial intermediaries and businesses in the real economy. As 
long as the Big Player influence and regime uncertainty persist confidence will 
be low; the costs of financial intermediation will be high and the flow of credit 
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will be low. Big Players and regime uncertainty have the potential to create a 
permanent slump. The low state of confidence they create is not self-correcting.  
In the next section I will consider in somewhat more detail the so-called Big 
Player theory. 
 
4. g.4. Uncertainty and the institutional context 
 
Both Minsky—and post-Keynesians more generally—on the one hand and 
Austrians on the other acknowledge the role and importance of Knightian 
uncertainty; as I will argue in this section, however, they disagree about the 
origins of (changes in) uncertainty and about how uncertainty relates to the 
relevant institutional context. 
Certainly it is possible to distinguish degrees of uncertainty and to enquire what 
causes uncertainty to increase (or decrease). Moreover degrees of uncertainty 
can be related to the institutional context.  
In one sense uncertainty is a universal aspect of human action in the sense that it 
is essentially inherent in action itself. (Mises ibid. 105)  It cannot be excluded, 
however, that part of the uncertainties actors in the economy have to face do not 
have this universal character but can be related to the particular institutional 
context that is in place. These uncertainties are then contingent in the sense that 
they could conceivably be removed through institutional reform. 
Considerations of this sort seem to underlie Keynes well-known proposal for “a 
somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment”.  (Keynes ibid. 378) 
According to Keynes, there are serious reasons to doubt that counter-cyclical 
policies narrowly conceived can save the market economy. Its flaws are too 
deeply rooted for that. The decentralized decision making, which is the heart and 
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soul of the market economy, must be eliminated or at least severely restricted. 
Full employment would become possible only through centralization. (also 
Garrison  ibid. 180 ff.) 
As R. Garrison clarifies: “ (…) in addition to the irreducible uncertainty about 
the future “state of nature,” each businessperson has to cope with the uncertainty 
about what other businesspeople will do. And in a capitalist setting each 
businessperson is driven by considerations of private costs and benefits rather 
than social costs and benefits. By itself, this added layer of uncertainty restricts 
the economy to a level of performance that Keynes finds wanting.” (ibid. 180) 
Arguably, then, the central message of the General Theory derives from 
comparative institutions analysis and not from the analysis of cyclical 
fluctuations. (ibid. 185) 
At the end of John Maynard Keynes (Minsky 2008) Minsky concludes as 
follows: 
“Keynes believed that the policy implications of his theory were profound; not 
only did the theory point to ways in which a closer approximation to full 
employment can be sustained, but he envisaged that continuing full employment 
combined with an emphasis on consumption and public goods would lead to an 
egalitarian change in income distribution. The rentier income of the capitalist 
would disappear and the upper tail of the income distribution would be snipped 
off by taxation. He believed that both measures to raise the consumption 
function and the socialization of investment were necessary to sustain full 
employment and were desirable as social goals.” (ibid. 157) 
Austrians have acknowledged the link between institutional context and the 
nature of expectations but their conclusions are virtually opposite to those of the 
post-Keynesians. According to the theory of Big Players, a stable economic 
environment with atomistic competition tends to produce rational outcomes and 
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prescient expectations. Lack of stability or atomism produces ignorance and 
uncertainty. In the presence of Big Players economic expectations tend to 
become less reliable. (Koppl 2002)  
The central result of the theory of Big Players is that expectations depend on 
institutions. Expectations will be more prescient in some institutional 
environments than in others. Stable environments tend to produce prescient 
expectations. Instability reduces the reliability of economic expectations. It is 
also a statement about learning in the market process. Expectations depend on 
institutions because institutions influence the process by which individual 
knowledge is changed. (Koppl 2002, 96) 
Adopting a Hayekian evolutionary stance, Butos and Koppl (1993) draw our 
attention to the filtering conditions of stability and atomicity. The failure of 
either condition creates a loose “system constraint” and thus a loose link 
between environment and expectations. The theory of “Big Players” gives an 
example of the empirical consequences of such a failure. 
A Big Player has three defining characteristics. The player is big in the sense 
that its actions influence the market under study; it is insensitive to the discipline 
of profit and loss; and it is arbitrary in the sense that its actions are based on 
discretion rather than any set of rules. (Koppl 2014,  97)  
If the market includes actors who are more or less immune from the competitive 
pressures of profit and loss, then the natural selection of rules will be inoperative 
with regard to these actors and the system constraint facing them will be loose. 
In such cases the privileged actors are free to act idiosyncratically. (Butos and 
Koppl ibid. 321) 
If the rules of the road, “constitutional rules” in Buchanan’s sense, change too 
often and by too much, then the general economic environment within which 
groups of rules compete will lack the stability necessary to select rules that 
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induce actions consistent with underlying scarcities. (ibid. 320) Without such 
stability, reliable expectations about the consequences of our actions cannot be 
formed. (ibid. 321)                        
An activist central bank is a representative Big Player—it can be large, it is 
protected and its actions will be unpredictable. Minsky is the advocate par 
excellence of an eminent role for Big Players in the economy. (also Prychitko 
2010) 
These results also seem compatible with long-established conclusions of the so-
called Socialist Calculation Debate. In the domain of money and banking 
Austrians have generally advocated the abolition of central banks and a move 
towards free (or decentralized) banking, despite some ongoing debates about 
how exactly free banking is to be defined. (See further.) 
 
4. (h) Explaining the upper turning point 
  
As pointed out previously, both Minsky’s theory and the Austrian theory are 
theories of the upper turning point. Explaining the upper turning point of the 
business cycle requires putting together the various pieces of the puzzle. As we 
have seen, however, the explanatory elements in both approaches differ. 
As Austrians see it, a particular integration of Austrian capital theory with 
monetary theory provides an explanation of why a credit-driven or policy-
induced boom must turn into a bust. In other words the Austrian theory explains 
the inevitability of the upper turning point following a boom resulting from 
credit creation not backed by an increase in genuine saving.  
How is the inevitability of the upper turning point explained in Minsky’s theory? 
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A crisis can occur if finance costs rise, if liquidity preference rises, or if income 
flows turn out to be less than expected. Endogenous processes tend to ensure 
that one of these (or all three) will, in fact, occur. (Wray 1992, 167-8) 
Let’s consider these elements in turn: 
(a)  Income flows turn out to be less than expected. Let’s recall some 
fundamentals. In Minsky’s analysis, investment spending is a fundamental 
determinant of aggregate effective demand, while investment is substantially 
determined by expected future aggregate demand. As Minsky puts it, investment 
this period is only forthcoming if investment is expected to take place next 
period since future investment will determine future aggregate demand and, 
thus, the aggregate profits which are necessary to validate investment projects 
undertaken this period. Each firm must weigh the supply price of capital against 
its demand price. The supply price will be a function of current production costs 
plus finance costs, including “lender’s risk” if the project requires external 
finance. The demand price will be a function of the expected stream of returns to 
be generated over the life of the asset, taking into account also “borrower’s 
risk”. (Wray ibid. 167) 
Expectations of increasing current output prices cause capital asset prices to rise 
relative to currently prevailing output prices. This, then, leads to an increase in 
borrowing to fund new investment.  
The increased borrowing leads to higher interest payments which can only be 
met if expectations of increased future returns are confirmed. Bankers must 
share the expectations of the firms if new lending is to be extended. The 
increased lending is reflected in the firms’ liabilities held as assets by the 
banking system to support its own liabilities, and acquired to fund the lending. 
The value of these liabilities also depends on the realization of expectations of 
future profit flows. A sufficiently large fall in capital asset prices may then have 
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an impact on the value of bank liabilities. Uncertainty over the value of a bank’s 
liabilities, i.e., its ability to meet its payment commitments, is the source of 
financial panic and crisis. For Minsky, Big Government spending can partially 
offset the fall in profit flows which results from a fall-off in investment or 
overoptimistic expectations, and in this way, provides support for consumption 
goods prices. (Kregel 1992, 87-8)   
At this point the Austrian theory of the business cycle can claim to be more 
precise and more complete since it provides an explanation both of why 
overoptimistic expectations would arise in the first place and of why these 
expectations must necessarily reveal themselves as erroneous. 
The Austrians would not dispute that a sudden and violent change in risk 
aversion—o r in perceptions of the riskiness inherent in investment 
undertakings—is likely to cause the economy to plunge into recession. What 
they would dispute is that such changes in risk aversion or in perceptions tend to 
happen spontaneously. They are much more likely to occur during a period in 
which the counter-movements of a boom-bust cycle have already begun to make 
themselves felt. (Garrison 2001, 159-60) 
(b) Liquidity preference rises. 
In the vision of Minsky, liquidity preference is clearly of central importance for 
the explanation of financial instability.  Liquidity preference is defined as a 
rational person’s demand for money as an asset; this leads to a determinate 
demand function for money for any value of higher-order uncertainty. Any 
increase in uncertainty shifts the liquidity preference function, and this shift can 
be quite marked and sudden. (Minsky 1982, 131)  
In addition to periods when the likelihood of various states of nature appears 
stable, there are troubled periods when the subjective estimates as to the 
likelihood of various states of nature are held with much less confidence. The 
56 
 
risk-averter reaction to a decline in confidence is to attempt to increase the 
weight of assets that yield flexibility in portfolio choices, in other words, to 
increase the value not only of money but also of all assets that have broad, deep, 
and resilient markets. 
Minsky assumes that two types of period can be distinguished: one in which 
beliefs are held with confidence concerning the likelihood of alternative states of 
nature occurring within some horizon period and the second in which such 
beliefs are most insecure. During these second periods—when what can be 
called higher-order uncertainty rules—markedly lower relative values are 
attached to assets whose nominal value depends upon the economy’s 
performance. Periods of higher-order uncertainty will see portfolios shift toward 
assets that offer protection against large declines in nominal values. Even though 
flexibility is almost always a virtue, the premium on assets that permit flexibility 
will be larger in such periods of higher-order uncertainty.  
 An immediate effect of a change in liquidity preference is upon the money price 
of capital assets. A decrease in liquidity preference leads to an increase in the 
money price of capital assets. An increase in liquidity preference, which 
typically occurs when quasi-rents fail to validate debt structures or financial 
markets fail to refinance positions, will force attempts to reduce near-term 
payment commitments relative to expected quasi-rents. This will lead to a fall in 
the money price of capital assets. (ibid. 74-5) 
As the implicit yield on money is primarily the value of the implied insurance 
policy it embodies, a decrease in uncertainty lowers this implicit yield and thus 
lowers the amount desired in portfolios. As all money must be held, as bankers 
are eager to increase its supply, and as its nominal value cannot decline, the 
money value of other assets, in particular real assets, must increase. (ibid. 133) 
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Minsky emphasizes the fact that in the General Theory and in later pieces 
clarifying it, Keynes treated liquidity preference as a relation between money 
and the price level of capital assets, and that this perspective is thus to be 
distinguished from the monetarist money-interest rate relation in which the 
liquidity preference function becomes a demand function for money. (ibid. 78) 
In Minsky’s construction liquidity preference is clearly intended to play a role in 
explaining the upper turning point. 
Just as supply prices tend to increase over the course of an expansion, demand 
prices will eventually fall. In an expansion, rising investment and appreciating 
asset prices generate aggregate profits, which tend to encourage both borrowers 
and lenders to accept liability structures in which payment commitments become 
closely articulated to receipts from assets. In fact, however, in the general 
euphoria debt commitments increase faster that the ability to pay. If a few large 
agents have second thoughts about their leverage ratios, or if a few expectations 
are disappointed, expected profits are reevaluated downward, and liquidity 
preference is increased. This process then reduces the demand price of capital 
assets below the supply price, so that investment falls. However, falling 
investment reduces aggregate profit flows so that profit expectations continue to 
fall and liquidity preference rises. This might cause a run to liquidity: firms that 
cannot meet payment commitments out of income flows or through borrowing 
must liquidate assets. However, asset liquidation under these circumstances 
requires devaluation and capital losses. As assets are devalued, ad as falling 
investment reduces profit flows, debts eventually are repudiated. Debt 
repudiation will reduce leverage ratios and the depression eventually sets the 
stage for the next expansion because interest rates will come down after balance 
sheets are liquidated through default. Furthermore, supply prices will tend to fall 
as rising unemployment reduces labor costs. (Wray ibid. 168) 
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(c) Finance costs rise. 
As an expansion proceeds, falling unemployment will tend to raise wages and 
cause capital asset supply prices to rise. Minsky argues that as bank balance 
sheets expand, there is upward pressure on interest rates because banks are 
concerned with leverage ratios. Furthermore, the central bank often attempts to 
constrain the growth of reserves at the peak of an expansion, which reduces 
bank liquidity (the ratio of cash assets to liabilities) and also tends to raise 
interest rates. Rising interest rates increase the portion of income flows which 
firms must commit to debt payments (firms must roll over some of the debt 
since construction projects take real time). As interest rates rise, “present value 
reversals” occur, which reduce planned investment, and may even cause some 
projects to be abandoned. Thus, current output prices and lender’s risk tend to 
rise during an expansion, setting the stage for crisis by inhibiting investment. 
(also Wray ibid. 168) 
Austrians would generally agree with the proposition that interest rates will tend 
to behave pro-cyclically in the later phases of an expansion.  (Hayek 1969 
[1978])  
Moreover capital-based macroeconomics allows for deeper insight into this 
phenomenon and added explanatory power. The high real interest rates on the 
eve of the bust can be linked to “distress borrowing” and to “commitments” 
made by the business community during the preceding monetary expansion. 
(Garrison ibid. 73) 
The unusually high (real) interest rates on the eve of the bust are accounted for 
in capital-based macroeconomics in terms of Hayek’s (1937 [1939]) 
“Investment that Raises the Demand for Capital.” The “investment” in the title 
of this article refers to the allocation of resources to the early stages of 
production; the “demand for capital” (and hence the demand for loanable funds) 
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refers to complementary resources needed in the later stages of production. (also 
Garrison ibid. 73) 
The question remains how strong the explanatory power or strength of Minsky’s 
theory really is. This matter is much contested.  
In their recently published book “The Rise and Fall of Money Manager 
Capitalism” Tymoigne and Wray (2014, 105) conclude: 
“The Minskian framework does not merely help to explain the Great Recession; 
it helps to explain macroeconomic dynamics over the past century. It can 
explain why Finance Capitalism was unstable, why Managerial Capitalism was 
more stable, and how financial instability returned from the late 1960s. At the 
core of the explanation of the stability of Managerial Capitalism is the big 
government and big bank that emerged as a response to the Great Depression.” 
In his recent assessment entitled “From Crisis to Confidence—Macroeconomics 
after the Crash” Austrian economist Prof. R. Koppl arrives at an entirely 
different conclusion, however, which is worth being quoted in full: 
“It is hard to see how Minsky’s theory goes beyond the claim that financial 
crises happen and that it is capitalism’s fault. It is a theory of the state of 
confidence that consists principally in the proposition that, in an economy where 
businesses are free to source their capital from financial markets, if confidence 
starts out strong, it will grow to dangerous heights and then collapse. The theory 
tells us nothing about the conditions that encourage or discourage ‘Ponzi 
Finance’ except to say that overconfidence will sooner or later overtake the 
capitalists. Nor does it say anything about how rapidly the system will move 
from hedge finance to Ponzi finance. As with some versions of animal spirits we 
have investor confidence moving up and down for no particular reason in an 
irregular and unpredictable way. It is hard to see how this theory goes beyond 
the claim that financial crises do sometimes happen, which is hardly an 
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explanation of why they happen. The human psychology behind the theory 
seems thin.” (Koppl 2014, 66-7) 
Koppl’s critique amounts to the claim that the theory is largely descriptive and 
lacks explanatory strength. 
 
4. (i) The role of innovation 
 
According to economists working in the tradition of Minsky, financial 
innovation is to be considered an important economic factor that promotes 
instability. Financial innovations end up promoting instability in two ways. Over 
a period of enduring expansion, innovation involves extending the use of 
existing financial products to more risky projects and the creation of financial 
products with higher embedded leverage (leverage on leverage). In addition, 
new financial products are marketed as sophisticated products that are better 
able to measure and/or to protect against risks associated with leverage, which 
tends to let people believe that the use of debt is safer than in the past. All this 
was observed very clearly over the past thirty years especially with the growth 
of securitization and derivative markets, and the belief that risk was better 
spread around in the system and allocated toward entities that could bear it best. 
(Tymoigne and Wray ibid. 33) 
Indeed in the wake of the financial crisis it has been possible to observe a 
tendency to demonize structured finance and to consider its use as a scapegoat 
and as the culprit of problems in the financial markets. However, it is difficult to 
see what the principled argument against the use of structured finance is. 
Structured finance is merely a tool. It can make credit cheaper by allocating it 
more efficiently. Rather it is the incentives that encouraged banks to move risk 
to insurance companies, ABCP investors, and other investors that caused the 
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problems. Thus while structured finance itself is not bad, it was certainly 
possible to use it badly. (Murphy 2009, 221) 
 
4. (j)  Interpreting Recent Historical Evidence: Minsky, the Austrians, and 
the Financial Crisis --  
 
The Financial Crisis and the Great Recession have offered various opportunities 
to heterodox schools in economics to try to demonstrate the fertility of their 
respective approaches and to claim the superiority of these vis-à-vis mainstream 
conceptualizations. Post-Keynesians as well as Austrians have actively 
participated in these debates. Several collections of papers have been published. 
Reference can be made to, among others, Kates (2010 and 2011), Dejuán et al. 
(2011) and some of the papers in Page West III and Whaples (2013). Mention 
should also be made of Booth (2009), Friedman (2011) and Beckworth (2012). 
Howden (2011) offers a European perspective. 
The final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) makes a 
strong case that the global financial crisis was foreseeable and avoidable. It did 
not “just happen”; it had nothing to do with “black swans with fat tails”; it was 
not an extreme event that “Nature” drew randomly from a set of possible 
outcomes. According to the FCIC report, the global financial crisis represents a 
dramatic failure of corporate governance and risk management, in large part a 
result of an unwarranted and unwise focus by financial institutions on trading 
(actually, gambling) and rapid growth. (FCIC 2011) 
Tymoigne and Wray (ibid. 250) note that, in all this, the biggest banks were 
aided and abetted by government “regulators” and “supervisors” who not only 
failed to properly oversee these institutions, but, indeed, continually pushed for 
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deregulation and desupervision in favor of “self-regulation” and “self-
supervision.”   
There is clearly some danger, however, in focusing on “bad actors”, bad 
financial practices, and “bad events”. It is important to understand longer-term 
trends. 
As noted already, Tymoigne and Wray (2014) argue that Minsky’s framework 
helps us to understand what has happened over the past half century instead of 
merely explaining the recent boom and crisis.  
The view taken in their book deviates somewhat from the FCIC report’s 
conclusions: financial fragility had grown on trend, making “it” (in the words of 
Minsky, referring to a Fisher’s type debt-deflation) likely to “happen again”—
even without “bad” behaviors by institutions and their regulators. They attempt 
to understand the “Minskyan” transformation—so that while the global financial 
crisis was not strictly inevitable, the financial structure made a crisis highly 
probable.  
They explain how capitalism in developed countries progressively moved from a 
more stable form of capitalism that Minsky called Managerial Capitalism to a 
more unstable form called Money Manager Capitalism. The 1980s S&L crisis 
put the final nail in the coffin of Managerial Capitalism as the system moved to 
Money Manager Capitalism (MMC). MMC is characterized by the rise of a 
predatory state, the disengagement of the government, the return of a pro-market 
mentality, and a growing role of financial markets in determining economic 
outcomes.  
Two main factors contributed to the Great Recession: pro-market policies and 
the decline in underwriting standards on loans and securities. Both contributed 
to the growth of indebtedness in the private sector and to the change in the 
quality of this indebtedness for the worse. This change in quality manifested 
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itself primarily through a move toward collateral-based lending, i.e., lending 
based on growing asset prices instead of income. The Great Recession was not a 
liquidity crisis but rather a solvency crisis. Unfortunately, most policies that 
have been implemented in the aftermath were aimed at solving the liquidity 
crises that occurred after the fall of Lehman Brothers. Nothing substantial has 
been done to address the underlying solvency problems. Instead of hiding losses 
and supporting poor management, the government should promote an orderly 
liquidation of banks. These authors conclude that the two main lessons we 
should have learned (but probably did not) from the global financial crisis is that 
the Great Recession did not happen by accident and that the global financial 
crisis was not a “liquidity crisis”. 
While Austrians might agree with certain descriptive elements contained in this 
narrative, they would certainly sharply dispute the thesis that the Great 
Recession was a consequence of pro-market policies.   
Indeed the Austrians, in general agreement with their pro-free-market 
philosophy, have in particular emphasized and highlighted (1) the role of the 
Fed in engineering excessive money and credit creation and (2) the perverse 
incentive effects of disastrous regulations.  
 
(a) The role of the Fed 
 
John Taylor (of the “Taylor rule”) has explained how, beginning in late 2001, 
the Federal Reserve, under the chairmanship of Alan Greenspan, began pushing 
the federal funds rate down, eventually to a level at which it was actually 
negative. (Taylor 2009; 2011) The result was that for several years the federal 
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funds rate was far below the optimal level prescribed by the Taylor rule, which 
calculates that level on the basis of inflation and output.  
Accordingly Austrians have generally considered that the subprime crisis 
constitutes a paradigm case of applicability of their theory. (Fillieule 2010, 179-
80) 
Thus Jesús Huerta de Soto (2011) has claimed that the approach of the Austrian 
School to the study of business cycles is well equipped to explain recent events. 
This author reminds that according to the Austrian view there is no way in 
which the economy can escape the sacrifice of present consumption and bypass 
the discipline of accumulated saving. Credit expansion and (fiduciary) inflation 
of the media of exchange offer no short cut to stable and sustained economic 
development. Money that does not originate from saving, but is generated only 
from credit expansion is bound to be channeled into “bad” investments, which 
eventually result in a reduction of capacity and employment, produce inflation in 
goods and assets markets, and give rise to speculative bubbles that will burst 
sooner or later. Huerta de Soto proposes a fundamental reform of financial and 
monetary institutions. (See further.) 
Gjerstad and Smith (2014) do not explicitly refer to the Austrian theory of the 
business cycle but several of their findings seem to be compatible with an 
interpretation in such terms.  
Experimental research informs the study of recessions and vice versa, greatly 
enhancing our understanding of the incentive and performance characteristic of 
markets and demonstrating the key proposition that not all markets are created 
equal. There are two fundamental types of markets, the performance of which 
has been studied in the laboratory. The first type is supply-and-demand markets 
that are repeated as flows of goods or services during successive time periods. 
These markets tend to converge quickly.  
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The second type is asset-market experiments. Smith et al. (1988) showed that 
human behavior in asset –trading markets leads to dramatically different 
convergence results than those in commodity-flow markets, even under 
conditions of high transparency. Subsequent experimental research on asset 
market bubbles has confirmed that asset prices typically deviate substantially 
from those predicted by the rational expectations market model. (ibid. 43)  
People in laboratory asset-market experiments, as well as their “sophisticated” 
counterparts in economies today, become entangled in self-sustaining 
expectations of escalating prices. One of the important parallels in behavior 
between experimental price bubbles and those in the housing market is that, as 
in the laboratory, money matters: the availability and aggressive marketing of 
mortgage credit supported the housing bubble until credit started to be 
withdrawn. (ibid. 269-70) The observation that prices can be sustained longer 
and more vigorously if momentum investors have more liquidity is consistent 
with experimental findings. More money makes for bigger bubbles. A 
significant and sustained change in monetary policy beginning in 2001 is 
potentially implicated in strengthening and imparting longer life to the mortgage 
market growth that fueled the housing price bubble. (ibid. 166-7) 
 
(b) The Regulatory Failure Thesis 
 
Friedman and Kraus (2011) debunk various elements of the conventional 
wisdom about what caused the financial crisis and argue that the crisis was a 
regulatory failure in which the prime culprit was the set of regulations governing 
banks’ capital levels known as the Basel rules. Theirs is an “incentives story” 
but it is not a moral-hazard story. They stress the role of radical ignorance on all 
sides. The triple-A ratings on MBS were conferred by three bond-rating 
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corporations that had been protected from competition by Securities and 
Exchange Commission regulation dating back to 1975. Not only bankers but 
investors of all kinds were either unaware that these three corporations were 
protected, or they were unaware of the implications of this protection for the 
accuracy of their ratings. This lack of awareness was apparently shared by the 
banking regulators, who had incorporated the three companies’ ratings into the 
Recourse Rule and Basel II. The financial crisis was transmitted into the 
nonfinancial or “real” economy through a lending contraction that began in mid-
2007, as banks were required to “mark to market” their holdings of mortgage-
backed securities in line with market fears about the value of these securities, 
due to rising rates of subprime mortgage delinquencies. 
As an aside, the fundamental question can here be raised of why the opinions 
and conclusions of historians diverge so strongly and widely? What is the 
philosophical nature of these disagreements between historians? 
One possible answer is that the disagreement is to be sought and found in the 
domain of theory. Interpretations of historical facts differ because the underlying 
theories differ.  
As Ludwig von Mises wrote: 
“Only those who believe that facts write their own story into the tabula rasa of 
the human mind blame the historians for such differences of opinion. They fail 
to realize that history can never be studied without presuppositions, and that 
dissension with regard to the presuppositions, i.e., the whole content of the non-
historical branches of knowledge, must determine the establishment of historical 
facts.” (1949, 53) 
This fact justifies the attention which has been devoted in this paper to a 
comparison of the respective theoretical presuppositions. It equally legitimizes, 
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to some degree, purely theoretical research within economics, i.e., the study of 
economics from a purely theoretical perspective. 
At a still deeper (or higher) level the disagreement is of an epistemological, 
methodological and thus philosophical nature. 
At the epistemological level Mises was strongly convinced of the objective and 
universalistic character of economic theory (praxeology). He rejected various 
forms of empiricism, historicism and relativism. His methodological views are 
not shared universally within the economics profession, however.     
Thus two leading followers of Minsky wrote recently: 
“Minsky was highly influenced by Institutional Economics and believed that an 
economic theory must be rooted into the institutional structure of the economic 
system it tries to explain. He rejected the idea that an economic theory can apply 
to all economic systems past and present, and argued that a careful analysis of 
the existing socio-political-economic institutions is necessary to formulate a 
meaningful analysis of existing economic problems.” (Tymoigne and Wray ibid. 
7) 
Austrians intent upon convincing their scientific and ideological opponents may 
consider such statements as an encouragement to go on clarifying and defending 
their meta-theoretical and methodological presuppositions.  
 
4.(k) Policy Implications 
 
Minsky’s theory of money supply endogeneity leads clearly to the conclusion 
that monetary growth policies are not effective at controlling financial market 
forces and are particularly inefficient in controlling the thrust toward speculative 
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finance. At the same time, Minsky also argues that two other policy instruments 
(federal government deficit spending and lender-of-last-resort interventions by 
the Federal Reserve) are extremely effective, if not at achieving full 
employment, at least in limiting the downside variability of incomes and 
liquidity during economic downturns, particularly in periods of incipient 
financial crisis. Drawing from Kalecki’s well-known accounting identity that, in 
a closed economy, profits equal investment plus the government deficit, Minsky 
argues that the effect of deficit spending during a downturn is to establish a floor 
for profits. At the same time, lender-of-mast-resort interventions are able to 
counteract the liquidity shortages of distressed financial firms. Because of the 
powerful effects of these policies, Minsky believed firmly that another large-
scale debt deflation and depression, such as occurred in the 1930s, could, at least 
in principle, be prevented from happening again. 
It is important to see that in Minsky’s “two price” view of the world, two 
stabilizers are needed: Big Government (BG) and a Big Bank (BB). For Minsky, 
Big Government spending can partially offset the fall in profit flows which 
results from a fall-off in investment or overoptimistic expectations, and in this 
way, provides support for consumption goods prices. But it cannot directly 
support the fall in the value of a bank’s assets which results from a fall in capital 
goods prices. This is why Big Government, by itself, is not enough to counter 
instability. A Big Bank must come in to stabilize the prices of capital assets. 
In the Minskyan scenario, deficit spending and lender-of-last-resort 
interventions, and the potential costs associated with risky financial practices 
are, to a considerable extent, socialized since government rather than firms 
absorbs these costs. The socialization of financial market risk promotes fragility 
since, as Minsky acknowledges, once borrowers and lenders recognize that the 
downside instability of profits has decreased, there will be an increase in the 
willingness and ability of business and bankers to debt finance. If the cash flows 
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to validate debt are virtually guaranteed by the profit implications of big 
government, then debt-financing of positions in capital assets is encouraged. 
(Minsky 1986) 
Austrians to the contrary generally deplore the movement towards command and 
control which they believe is a mistake that threatens the wealth and welfare of 
the people. Instead we need to restore the rule of law and economic liberalism. 
In other words, in order to significantly reduce regime uncertainty and Big 
Player influence we need to take the “constitutional turn”, which may be 
considered both a Hayekian move and a public choice move. Such a economic 
constitution would have to comprise: (a) Fiscal discipline since when 
government revenues are big enough, uncertainty over the tax bill becomes 
destructive regime uncertainty and a drag on output; (b) A monetary constitution 
since only if current austerity is combined with sensible reforms to create a 
sound monetary constitution will the likelihood of future debt crises be reduced; 
(c) A regulatory constitution since without real regulatory reform there is little 
hope to escape crony capitalism that increases the role of Big Players; we should 
regulate the regulators in the same way that markets regulate private firms. 
(Koppl 2014) 
Let’s consider in somewhat more detail the monetary dimension.  
In the context of a central banking regime, Selgin (1997) has advocated a so-
called productivity norm as the alternative to zero (or positive) inflation.  
Under a productivity norm, changes in velocity would be prevented (as under 
zero inflation) from influencing the price level through offsetting adjustments in 
the supply of money. But adverse “supply shocks” like wars and harvest failures 
would be allowed to manifest themselves in higher output prices, while 
permanent improvements in productivity would be allowed to lower prices 
permanently. (ibid. 10) In reality productivity is constantly changing, generally 
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for the better. In the real world, a little secular deflation, along with upward 
movements in the price level mirroring adverse supply shocks, would be better 
than zero inflation. (ibid. 14)   
Huerta de Soto (2012, 736) argues that in order to establish a truly stable 
financial and monetary system for the twenty-first century, a system which 
protects our economies as far as possible from crisis and recessions, the 
following will be necessary: (1) complete freedom of choice in currency; (2) a 
system of free banking, and the abolition of the central bank; and most 
importantly, (3) obligatory observance of traditional legal rules and principles 
by all agents involved in the free banking system, particularly the important 
principle according to which no one may enjoy the privilege of loaning 
something entrusted to him on demand deposit. In short it is necessary to 
maintain at all times a banking system which includes a 100-percent reserve 
requirement. 
Huerta de Soto’s definition of free banking is not shared, however, by authors 
who advocate a fractional- reserve free banking system as an alternative to 
central banking. (Selgin 1988) Although the proposal for fractional-reserve free 
banking is fraught with serious conceptual problems (Van den Hauwe 2009b), 
the debate between the two factions can be expected to go on.  
 
Conclusion: superficial similarities, profound divergences 
 
Minsky is difficult to categorize as an economist. While his status as a 
Keynesian seems somewhat questionable, the analogies and/or similarities of his 
theoretical analysis with the analysis of the Austrians are no more than 
superficial. There undeniably exists some scope for cross-fertilization between 
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both approaches but at a fundamental conceptual level the theories are difficult 
to reconcile.   
Much of the disagreement on policy issues between post-Keynesians and 
Austrians hinges on the answer to the underlying question of whether the actions 
and interventions of Big Players in mixed economies are stabilizing or 
destabilizing. Post-Keynesians believe they can indeed be stabilizing; Austrians 
to the contrary believe that mostly they will be destabilizing.  
Minsky’s policy conclusions manifest a lack of familiarity with the conclusions 
of the Austrian analysis of the problems of central planning as well as a blind 
faith in the stabilizing role that can be played by Big Players such as Big Bank 
and Big Government.  
The Austro-Wicksellian paradigm arguably provides superior insights that can 
complement and correct Minskyan analyses of the historical experience of the 
Financial Crisis and Great Recession.  
Ludwig van den Hauwe 
References  
Beckworth, D. (2012), Boom and Bust Banking—The Causes and Cures of the 
Great Recession, Oakland: The Independent Institute. 
Bellofiore, R. and Piero Ferri (2001a), Financial Keynesianism and Market 
Instability—The Economic Legacy of Hyman Minsky Volume I, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Bellofiore, R and Piero Ferri (2001a), Introduction: ‘Things fall apart, the centre 
cannot hold’, in: Bellofiore and Ferri (2001a), 1-29 and in: Bellofiore and Ferri 
(2001b), 1-29. 
72 
 
Bellofiore, R. and Piero Ferri (2001b), Financial Fragility and Investment in the 
Capitalist Economy—T he Economic Legacy of Hyman Minsky Volume II, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Butos, W.N. and R. Koppl (1993), Hayekian Expectations: Theory and 
Empirical Expectations, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 4 N° 3, 303-29. 
Cantillon, R. ([1755] 2001), Essay on the Nature of Commerce in General, 
London: Transaction Publishers.  
Cochran, J.P. and F.R. Glahe (1992), The Use and Abuse of Equilibrium in 
Business Cycle Theory—A Praxeological Approach, Cultural Dynamics, 5: 356-
70; 
Cochran, J.P. and F.R. Glahe (1999), The Hayek-Keynes Debate—Lessons for 
Current Business Cycle Research, Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press. 
De Antoni, E. (2010), Minsly’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’: the not-too-
Keynesian optimism of a financial Cassandra, in: Zambelli (2010), 462-84. 
Dejuán, Ó, Febrero E. and Marcuzzo, M.C. (2011), The First Great Recession of 
the 21st Century, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Fazzari, S. and Dimitri B. Papadimitriou (eds.) (1992), Financial Conditions and 
Macroeconomic Performance, New York: Sharpe. 
Fazzari, S. (1992), Introduction: Conversations with Hyman Minsky, in Fazzari 
and Papadimitriou (1992), 3-26. 
Fillieule, R. (2010), L’école autrichienne d’économie—Une autre hétérodoxie, 
France: Septentrion. 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), New York: PublicAffairs. 
73 
 
Friedman J. (ed.) (2011), What Caused the Financial Crisis?, Oxford: University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
Friedman, J. and Wladimir Kraus, (2011), Engineering the Financial Crisis—
Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Garrison, R.W. (1992), Is Milton Friedman a Keynesian? In: Skousen (1992), 
131-47. 
Garrison, R.W. (2001), Time and Money—The Macroeconomics of Capital 
Structure, London: Routledge. 
Garrison, R.W. (2005), The Austrian School, in: Snowdon B. and Vane H.R. 
(2005), 474-516. 
Gjerstad, S.D. and V.L. Smith (2014), Rethinking Housing Bubbles—The Role 
of Household and Bank Balance Sheets in Modeling Economic Cycles, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Gloria-Palermo, S. (1999) , The Evolution of Austrian Economics, London : 
Routledge. 
Gloria-Palermo, S. (2013), L’école économique autrichienne, Paris: La 
Découverte. 
Godley, W. and M. Lavoie (2012), Monetary Economics—An Integrated 
Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth, New York : 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Goodspeed, T.B. (2012), Rethinking the Keynesian Revolution, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hayek, F.A. (1978) New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the 
History of Ideas, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
74 
 
Hayek, F.A. (1969 [1978]), Three Elucidations of the Ricardo Effect, in: Hayek 
(1978): 165-178. 
Hayek, F.A. (1939) Profits, Interest and Investment, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Hayek, F.A. (1937 [1939], Investment that Raises the Demand for Capital, in: 
Hayek (1939) : 73- 82. 
Higgs, R. (1997), Regime uncertainty: why the Great Depression lasted so long 
and why prosperity resumed after the war, Independent Review, Volume I N°4: 
561-90. 
Horwitz, S. (2000), Microfoundations and Macroeconomics—An Austrian 
Perspective, London: Routledge. 
Howden, D. (2011), Institutions in Crisis—European Perspectives on the 
Recession, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Huerta de Soto, J. (2011), A brief note on economic recessions, banking reform, 
and the future of capitalism, in:  Dejuán et al. (2011): 33-41. 
Huerta de Soto, J. (2012), Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles, Auburn : 
Ludwig von Mises Institute. 
Ikeda, S. (1997), Dynamics of the Mixed Economy, London: Routledge.  
Kates, S. (ed.) (2010), Macroeconomic Theory and its Failings, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Kates, S. (ed.) (2011), The Global Financial Crisis—W hat Have We Learnt? 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Keynes, J.M. (1936 [1997]), The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money, New York: Prometheus Books.  
75 
 
Knoop, T.A. (2008), Modern Financial Macroeconomics—Panics, Crashes, and 
Crises, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  
Koppl, R. (2002), Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations, New 
York: Palgrave. 
Koppl, R. (2014), From Crisis to Confidence—Macroeconomics after the Crash, 
London: IEA. 
Kregel, J.A. (1992), Minsky’s “Two rice” Theory of Financial Instability and 
Monetary Policy: Discounting versus Open Market Intervention, in: Fazzari and 
Papadimitriou (1992), 85-103. 
Lachmann L. (1937 [1994]), Uncertainty and Liquidity-Preference, in Lavoie 
(1994) , 29-41. 
Lavoie, D. (ed.) (1994), Expectations and the Meaning of Institutions, London: 
Routledge.  
Leijonhufvud, A. (1981), Information and Coordination—Essays in 
Macroeconomic Theory, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Leijonhufvud, A. (1981), The Wicksell Connection: Variations on a Theme, in: 
Leijonhufvud (1981), 131-202. 
Leijonhufvud A. (2009), Out of the corridor: Keynes and the crisis, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 33: 741-757. 
Machlup, F. (1976), Hayek's Contribution to Economics, in: Machlup, ed., 
Essays on Hayek, Hillsdale, Mich.: Hillsdale College Press, 13-59. 
Mehrling, P. (1999), The vision of Hyman P. Minsky, Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 39: 129-58. 
76 
 
Meltzer, A.H. (1988), Keynes’s Monetary Theory—A Different Interpretation, 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Menger, C. (1871[1994]), Principles of Economics, Grove City: Libertarian 
Press. 
Minsky, H.P. (1975 [2008]), John Maynard Keynes, New York: McGraw Hill. 
Minsky, H.P. (1982), Can “It” Happen Again—Essays on Instability and 
Finance, New York: Sharpe. 
Minsky, H.P. (1986 [2008]), Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, New York: 
McGraw Hill. 
Minsky, H.P. (1993), On the non-neutrality of money, FRBNY Quarterly 
Review (Spring), 77-82. 
Minsky, H.P. (2004), Induced Investment and Business Cycles, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Mises, L. von (1949 [1966]), Human Action—A Treatise on Economics, Fourth 
Revised Edition, New York: FEE. 
Murphy, D. (2009), Unravelling the Credit Crunch, London: CRC Press. 
O’Driscoll G. and Rizzo M.J. (1996), The Economics of Time and Ignorance, 
London: Routledge. 
Page West III G. and Robert M. Whaples (eds.) (2013), The Economic Crisis in 
Retrospect—Explanations by Great Economists, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Papadimitriou, D.B. (2004), Introduction in: Minsky (2004), ix-xvi. 
Papadimitriou, D.B. and L. Randall Wray (2010), The Elgar Companion to 
Hyman Minsky, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
77 
 
Posner, R.A. (2011), The Causes of the Financial Crisis, in: Friedman (2011), 
279-94. 
Prychitko, D.L. (2010), Competing explanations of the Minsky moment: The 
financial instability hypothesis in light of Austrian theory, Review of Austrian 
Economics, 23: 199-221. 
Rabin, A.A. (2004), Monetary Theory, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Ravier, A.O. (2013), Dynamic Monetary Theory and the Phillips Curve with a 
Positive Slope, Quarterly Journal of Austrian economics, Vol. 16, N° 2, 165-86. 
Rothbard, M.N. (1962[2004]), Man, Economy, State, Auburn: Ludwig von 
Mises Institute. 
Selgin G.A. (1988) The Theory of Free Banking—Money Supply under 
Competitive Note Issue, Rowman & Littlefield. 
Selgin, G. (1997), Less Than Zero—The Case for a Falling Price Level in a 
Growing Economy, London : IEA. 
Simpson, D. (2013), The Rediscovery of Classical Economics, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Skousen, M. (ed.) (1992) Dissent on Keynes—A Critical Appraisal of 
Keynesian Economics, New York: Praeger. 
Smith, V.L. (1991), Papers in Experimental Economics, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Smith, V.L., Suchanek, G.L. and Williams, A.W. (1988), Bubbles, crashes, and 
endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets, in: Smith, V.L. 
(1991), 339-371. 
78 
 
Smithin, J. (2013), Essays in the Fundamental Theory of Monetary Economics 
and Macroeconomics, Singapore: World Scientific. 
Snowdon B. and Vane H.R. (2005), Modern Macroeconomics—Its Origins, 
Development and Current State, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Svetlova E. and Fiedler M. (2011), Understanding crisis: on the meaning of 
uncertainty and probability, in Dejuán et al. (2001), 42-62. 
Taylor, J.B. (2009), Getting Off Track—How Government Actions and 
Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis, Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press. 
Taylor, J.B. (2011), Monetary Policy, Economic Policy and the Financial Crisis: 
An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong, in: Friedman (2011), 150-171. 
Tymoigne, E. and L. Randall Wray (2014), The Rise and Fall of Money 
Manager Capitalism, London: Routledge. 
Van den Hauwe, L. (2009a), Foundations of Business Cycle Research Volume I, 
Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag. 
Van den Hauwe, L. (2009b), Three Essays in Monetary Theory, Norderstedt: 
BoD. 
Van den Hauwe, L. (2011), John Maynard Keynes and Ludwig von Mises on 
Probability, .Journal of Libertarian Studies 22, No. 1: 471–507. 
Wicksell, K. (1936[1965]), Interest and Prices, New York: Augustus M. Kelley. 
Wolf, M. (2014), The Shifts and the Shocks, London: Allen Lane. 
Wray, L.R. (1992), Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis and the 
Endogeneity of Money, in: Fazzari and Papadimitriou (1992), 161-180. 
79 
 
Yeager, L. (1988), The Austrian School on Money and Gold, Journal of 
Economic Studies, 15(3/4), 92-105. 
Zambelli, S. (ed.) (2010), Computable, Constructive and Behavioural Economic 
Dynamics, London: Routledge. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                   
